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This research attempts to analyse whether the praxis of a failed nonviolence campaign informs 
Gene Sharp’s pragmatic nonviolence theories. It summarises the theory into an eleven point 
checklist, and then outlines the history of a thirty year campaign against a Five Eyes spy base 
at Waihopai, New Zealand. The case study is then analysed through the checklist to ascertain 
whether the successes and failures of the campaign are predicted by the theory, or if the case 
study reveals flaws in the theory. The research concludes that the theory is a good fit for the 
case study, and with minor modifications, remains relevant for this context.  
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In the study of nonviolence, an increasing amount has been written about the use of the practice 
in regime change, as the potential for this becomes evident from successes such as The 
Philippines, South Africa, Serbia, and various Middle Eastern countries. Many of these 
movements have been directly influenced by nonviolence theory.1 Academically, the field has 
moved past the deductive reasoning which created theories from observation of historical 
events, such as Gene Sharp’s fundamental work The Politics of Nonviolent Action, to begin 
investigation into the nuances of various nonviolent methods, further exploring the role that 
context has on the success of nonviolence, and pinpointing which factors in campaigns are most 
influential in that success. Chenoweth and Stephan’s empirical work on the relative success of 
nonviolent over violent struggle has been particularly influential.2 
This focus is reflective of much of the field internationally, which is very invested in learning 
more about what brings about regime change, the downfall of dictatorships, the end of apartheid 
and similar systems, but which has not engaged as much with the everyday activism of 
thousands of campaigns across the first world against military bases, nuclear weapons, military 
action, and government cutbacks in welfare and public spending.3 Nepstad notes that we cannot 
assume the factors shaping nonviolent revolutions against political rulers are the same as the 
ones that shape nonviolent struggles against other organisations and systems.4 
In New Zealand, work on nonviolent campaigns in this liberal, democratic nation has largely 
been at the descriptive, rather than analytical, levels, commonly written by activists.5 These 
                                               
1 Gene Sharp was, for example, approached to provide materials to support a nonviolence movement in Burma, 
which was published as Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for 
Liberation, 4 ed. (Boston, MA: The Albert Einstein Institution, 2010). This was originally published in 
Bangkok in 1993, and since translated into 31 languages. Attempts to distribute it in some places such as 
Russia, Burma, and China have been met with repression. 
2 See Maria J.  Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent 
Conflict," International Security 33, no. 1 (2008); Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, Why Civil Resistance 
Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
3 Kurt Schock, "The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance," Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 3 (2013): 286. 
4 Sharon Erickson Nepstad, Nonviolent Struggle: Theories, Strategies, and Dynamics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 167. 
5 See for example, Elsie Locke, Peace People: A History of Peace Activities in New Zealand (Christchurch, NZ: 
Hazard Press, 1992); Trevor Richards, Dancing on Our Bones: New Zealand, South Africa, Rugby and Racism 
(Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1999); Thomas Oliver Newnham, Peace Squadron: The Sharp End of 
Nuclear Protest in New Zealand (Auckland: Graphic Publications, 1986); and Maire Leadbeater, Peace, Power 
& Politics: How New Zealand Became Nuclear Free (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2013). Waihopai 
activist June Gregg completed a MA thesis at the University of Bradford in 2000 entitled “Waihopai Women’s 
Camp”, but unfortunately the University has disposed of it. Ms Gregg no longer has a personal copy, so I have 
been unable to access this piece of relevant academic research for this thesis. 
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books are valuable for the material and knowledge that they bring together, but they do not seek 
to answer questions about the strength of nonviolence as a method, nor about how it was applied 
in New Zealand. Their authors do not have the distance from the campaign to critically appraise 
these movements and their weaknesses, nor the connection to theory to reflect on the 
relationship between nonviolence theory and praxis. These will be the tasks of this thesis, in 
relation to a thirty year campaign against a spy base located at Waihopai, New Zealand. 
While many international works6 are deductive in nature, focusing upon movement outcomes 
to understand when nonviolence is successful, and what its long term consequences are,7 very 
few turn this around by analysing case studies to try and understand whether the practice 
confirms the theory, or if it exposes contradictions or weaknesses. Nepstad,8 and Ackerman and 
Kruelger9  have tried this approach, however their work focused upon state-wide movements 
against regimes, not local campaigns against single issues. Theory is obviously key in informing 
praxis, but to what extent does the praxis of nonviolence inform its theories? 
Nepstad notes that many works only consider successful cases – by ignoring failed cases it is 
impossible to discern the critical factors that led to victory, and theorists fail to learn from the 
experience of failure.10 This thesis will analyse the successes and failures of a thirty year 
campaign, using both to analyse the value of nonviolence theory. 
To engage with these questions, this thesis will have three sections. First, a background to 
pragmatic nonviolence theory, using Gene Sharp’s works as a model. Sharp’s theories will be 
used because not only are they influential throughout much of the world, but also they are the 
theories that were taught in New Zealand by the Nonviolent Action Network in Aotearoa during 
the 1980s, a group which included activists who protested at Waihopai spy base.11 This section 
                                               
6 See Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Part One: Power and Struggle (Boston, MA: Extending 
Horizons Books, 1973); Peter Ackerman and Jack Duvall, A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent 
Conflict (New York: Palgrave, 2000); Doug McAdam and Sydney Tarrow, "Nonviolence as Contentious 
Interaction," PS: Political Science & Politics June (2000); Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance 
Works; Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher, eds., Nonviolent Social Movements: A 
Geographical Perspective (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1999); and Peter Ackerman and Christopher 
Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 1994). 
7 Sharon Erickson Nepstad, "Nonviolent Resistance Research," Mobilization: An International Quarterly 20, no. 
4 (2015): 418. 
8 Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
9 Ackerman and Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict. 
10 Nepstad, Nonviolent Revolutions, xiii. 
11 See Rachel Bloomfield, People Organising for Power: Nonviolent Action for Social Change in New Zealand 
(Wellington, NZ: Inner City Ministry, 1982); Allan Cumming, Understanding Nonviolence (Dunedin: Dunedin 
Nonviolent Action Resource Group, 1983); How Nonviolence Works (Dunedin: Nonviolent Action Network 
in Aotearoa, 1985); and How Nonviolence Works (Nonviolent Action Network in Aotearoa, 2011). 
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will culminate in a list of key points of pragmatic nonviolence, which outline how it should 
achieve change. Some alternative theories will be briefly explored in comparison.12 
Second, a summary of thirty years of campaigning against Waihopai spy base, since the 1987 
announcement it was going to be built, will be presented. In particular, this will seek to analyse 
which types of actions and approaches to nonviolence were most successful, and why the 
campaign has failed to create change. 
Last, the experience of praxis will be compared with the theory of nonviolence. Do the 
successes of campaigning against Waihopai match the theory? Do the failures indicate where 
activists have stepped away from theory, or does the failure of praxis indicate problems with 
applying the theory to this context? 
The author has a background as both an activist and a nonviolence trainer, mostly with young 
activists working in student and peace movements. Much of what the field considers to be a 
‘pragmatic’ approach to nonviolence formed the content of the workshops that I taught in 1990s 
New Zealand. If I was to return to that work now, over twenty years later, the content would 
not have changed significantly, despite twenty years of successful and failed nonviolent 
campaigns internationally and in New Zealand.13 This thesis is an attempt to inform future 
campaigns and nonviolent trainers so that they may learn from their past. 
 
 
                                               
12 This thesis will limit itself to the exploration of alternative nonviolent theories, and will not for example, contrast 
them with social movement theory. For more on the potential relationship between nonviolent and social 
movement theories see Schock, "The Practice and Study of Civil Resistance”. 
13 The author attended a nonviolence workshop in 2017 by an international academic. The theoretical content and 
nonviolent tools were almost exactly the same as taught by the author twenty years earlier. Reading of 
nonviolence manuals such as Srdja Popovic, Andrej Milivojevic, and Slobodan Djinovic, Nonviolent Struggle 
50 Crucial Points: A Strategic Approach to Everyday Tactics (Belgrade: CANVAS, 2006) and War Resisters’ 
International, Handbook for Nonviolent Campaigns (London: War Resisters’ International, 2014) leads to a 
similar conclusion. For practical training seemingly to be influenced neither by time or location contrasts 
strongly with formal education which continues to change with time, and is very influenced by context. 
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Chapter One: Pragmatic Nonviolence 
When people refuse their cooperation, withhold their help, and persist in their 
disobedience and defiance, they are denying their opponent the basic human 
assistance and cooperation which any government or hierarchical system requires. 
If they do this in sufficient numbers for long enough, that government or 
hierarchical system will no longer have power. This is the basic political assumption 
of nonviolent action.14 
This chapter will first provide a general introduction to nonviolence theory and its origins, 
including the dichotomies of reformist/revolutionary, direct/indirect, and pragmatic/principled 
nonviolence, along with definitions of pacifism and civil disobedience. It will then focus on 
pragmatic nonviolence, particularly sources of power, consent theory, pillars of support, and 
criticisms of its approach in this area. An explanation of the dynamics of nonviolence, 
contention, repression and ‘political jiu jitsu’ will then follow. The chapter will then explore 
the outcomes of nonviolent campaigns and consider why they succeed or fail, finishing with a 
brief exploration of alternative theories. It will conclude by extracting a checklist to be 
compared with the case study in order to assess nonviolence theory. 
There have been numerous texts written on pragmatic nonviolence, and Gene Sharp’s work 
continues to inspire activists, even as increased understanding of the dynamic produces further 
studies which are at times critical of Sharp’s theories. It is not intended to reproduce these works 
in depth, but instead outline the key points and the assumptions behind them. The theory 
presented in this chapter is general in nature rather than specific to a context,15 and most often 
applied to or inspired by country-wide regime change, rather than specific liberal-democratic 
policy change. 
History of Nonviolence 
Nonviolence has a long history, which this thesis will not attempt to trace. However, three 
important theorists and practitioners are particularly influential on both the theory and practice 
of nonviolence and worthy of brief explanation: Thoreau, Gandhi, and King. Thoreau 
                                               
14 Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Part One: Power and Struggle, 64. 
15 While it has been used in many different contexts, Sharp’s pragmatic nonviolence theory has been developed 
by a white male citizen of a Western military power, which no doubt shapes it. 
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introduced key ideas while explaining his own civil disobedience: that there is a higher moral 
law, and that where that moral law is in conflict with the law of the land, the duty is to violate 
that lesser law, which will lead to consequences such as jail.16 He was dismissive of institutional 
methods of change, such as voting, to address the conflict of laws, stating that “Even voting for 
the right is doing nothing for it. It is only expressing to men feebly your desire that it should 
prevail. A wise man will not leave the right to the mercy of chance, nor wish it to prevail through 
the power of the majority”.17 
Thoreau’s writings, along with letters and writings from Tolstoy,18 influenced Gandhi as he 
began to create his own theories of nonviolence, first in South Africa, and then in India. 
Gandhi’s contribution to nonviolent theory and praxis is often presented as primarily moral in 
character, but this underplays the significance of his strategic awareness.19 With these two 
strengths he created the first theoretical model of nonviolent action.20 Gandhi’s approach was 
based on ahimsa (nonviolence, or creation of understanding) and the use of suffering to engage 
in satyagraha, which is “the fight for truth and collective self-realisation through nonviolent 
resistance against falsity, violence and oppression, and a preparedness to endure the personal 
consequences of this fight and struggle”.21 Gandhi saw nonviolence as a process that brought 
understanding rather than defeat to the opposition, and believed that means of change needed 
to be linked to end goals. He therefore engaged in constructive practices, seeking to create 
nonviolent structures and practices in society as part of the process of change.22 Gandhi was not 
only successful in freeing India from British rule, but his theories and praxis of nonviolence 
continue to influence theorists and practitioners of nonviolence today. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., inspired by both Thoreau and Gandhi, led a series of nonviolent 
campaigns to end segregation in Southern USA. King, like Gandhi, came from a spiritual 
background, and saw his approach to nonviolence as one of challenging unjust systems and 
practices, rather than the people who happened to implement them. He also adopted a 
willingness to accept suffering without retaliation as a tool for transforming opponents, centred 
upon a principle of agape (love) for opponents and a faith that justice would prevail.23 King 
                                               
16 Henry David Thoreau, The Variorum: Civil Disobedience (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc, 1967), 19. 
17 Ibid., 37. Emphasis in original. 
18 Leo Tolstoy, Letter on Nonresistance (www.nonresistance.org, 1890). 
19 Nepstad, "Nonviolent Resistance Research," 417. 
20 Todd  May, Nonviolent Resistance: A Philosophical Introduction (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2015), 72. 
21 Stellan Vinthagen, A Theory of Nonviolent Action: How Civil Resistance Works (London: Zed Books, 2015), 
31. 
22 Gene Sharp, Gandhi as a Political Strategist: With Essays on Ethics and Politics (Boston, MA: Extending 
Horizons Books, 1979), 65, 81. 
23 Martin Luther King, Jr, Stride toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), 102-
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saw nonviolent tension which sought to create a crisis that a community would be forced to 
confront as essential for social change.24 
What is Nonviolence? 
What therefore is nonviolence? Atack defines it as “collective action outside the formal 
institutions or procedures of the state that avoids the systematic or deliberate use of violence or 
armed force to achieve its political or social objectives”.25 All types of nonviolence have several 
common features: they are active, rather than passive; they, at least in part, step outside the 
formal institutions of the state to seek change (while possibly seeking change from those 
institutions); and they avoid not only direct violence, but structural and cultural violence. 
Nonviolence is not the same thing as pacifism, which is a moral or ideological stance on the 
use of violence. Nonviolence is a method of fighting oppression and injustice.26 It may be 
undertaken with pacifist aims (such as opposition to military action) but many nonviolent 
campaigns do not seek to end direct violence as a goal. It is also not necessarily the same thing 
as civil disobedience, though it is often used as a synonym. Civil disobedience is action that 
breaks the law, which may be part of nonviolent action, but which is not required to be 
nonviolent. 
Nonviolence may be reformist, seeking to get the state or other power to agree to change a law, 
policy, or action, in which case it relies on state power to work. Alternatively it may be 
revolutionary or transformative, and seek to change the nature of the state via overthrow or 
substantial change in structure.27 Its action may directly attack an opponent’s power, such as 
through strikes and mutinies, or indirectly, via supporters of the opponent.28 Last, it may be 
pragmatic in nature, concerned primarily with winning through the most effective means, or 
principled, and more concerned about the means of struggle. 
Pragmatic Nonviolence 
I will now turn to look more closely at pragmatic nonviolence. Sharp’s theories approach 
nonviolence not from a pacifist or moral perspective, but strategically, as a technique rather 
                                               
7. 
24 Martin Luther King, Jr., "Letter from a Birmingham Jail,"  https://web.cn.edu/kwheeler/documents/ 
Letter_Birmingham_Jail.pdf 
25 Iain Atack, Nonviolence in Political Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 8. 
26 Nepstad, Nonviolent Struggle, 2. 
27 Robert J. Burrowes, The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach (Albany, NY: State University 
of New York, 1996), 99. 
28 Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Part Three: The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action (Boston, MA: 
Extending Horizons Books, 1973), 452-53. 
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than a belief system.29 Pragmatic nonviolent conflict did not start from a premise that resolution 
of differences is the highest goal, but instead that valid social objectives must be actively 
pursued. It is therefore primarily a technique about the prosecution rather than resolution of 
conflict.30 Sharp saw nonviolence not as a substitute for verbal persuasion, but rather an 
alternative to political violence.31 
Sharp believed that power does not, as was commonly accepted, come from violence.32 In this 
he agreed with Arendt, who argued that power and violence were distinct, but held to be the 
same because they have the same function of ruling over people.33 According to Sharp, power, 
instead of being monolithic and intrinsic to political elites, is pluralistic, social in nature, and 
reliant upon consent of the governed. Obedience is therefore a form of cooperation with elites, 
as it involves an active choice of consent.34 This consent theory of power is key to Sharp’s 
argument – power comes from the obedience and cooperation given by subjects or citizens, but 
this, despite inducements, pressures, sanctions, remains essentially voluntary. Because all 
political power is based upon consent, that power is fragile.35 Consent could be withdrawn from 
the ruling elite by either the general population, or institutional pillars of support that the elite 
relied on to govern.36 Sharp’s sources of power were therefore authority, human resources, 
skills and knowledge ‘intangible factors’ (cultural, ideological), material resources, and 
sanctions, rather than violence.37  
Sharp put a great deal of emphasis on strategic planning, in particular identifying sources of 
power, and the pillars of support of the opponent. These pillars, often institutions, were the 
supporting structures that directly held up the opponent, such as military, police, media, 
corporate and political elites, and industry. A successful nonviolent campaign would undermine 
these pillars of support, either making them weak and crumble, or causing them to switch sides, 
ending their support for the opponent.38 The planning process gave the resisters the ability to 
assess the strengths and weaknesses of the opponent and attack weaker pillars of support - like 
social institutions such as churches and unions - that had concerns about rulers. It also allowed 
                                               
29 Maia Carter Hallward and Julie M. Norman, "Understanding Nonviolence," in Understanding Nonviolence: 
Contours and Contexts, ed. Maia Carter Hallward and Julie M. Norman (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2015), 
20. 
30 Ackerman and Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, 5. 
31 Gene Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom (Boston, MA: Extending Horizons Books, 1980), 127. 
32 Alan Leo, "Some Words Are More Powerful Than Guns," Index on Censorship 44, no. 3 (2015). 
33 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970), 43. 
34 Vinthagen, A Theory of Nonviolent Action, 40. 
35 Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Part One: Power and Struggle, 28. 
36 Atack, Nonviolence in Political Theory, 106-09. 
37 Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Part One: Power and Struggle, 11-12. 
38 Atack, Nonviolence in Political Theory, 114. 
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resisters to assess their own strengths and weaknesses and then choose methods which used 
their strengths – if there was widespread discontent in the population then a boycott or general 
strike might be successful. If concern was limited to a small group then a sit-in or vigil may be 
more appropriate. 
The ability of a resister to sever an opponent from its sources of support is what Schock has 
termed its leverage.39 In order for a campaign to be successful, there must not only be sources 
of power, but the campaign has to have the ability to break the links to those sources. Leverage 
is impacted by the social distance between the challenger and the opponent – where the social 
distance is short, through similar social class, gender, race, or through family, friendships, or 
other ties, there is an increased moral dependence by the opponent on the challenger. Where 
the social distance is long, in the absence of these relationships, the moral dependence is 
reduced, and the challenging group will struggle to influence the opponent.40 
This consent theory of power has attracted the most criticism of Sharp’s argument, so I will 
pause to consider some of these challenges to this fundamental base of pragmatic nonviolence 
theory. Sharp assumes that consent is given voluntarily. In this he has a simplistic understanding 
of consent, focusing entirely on individuals, ignoring the role of structural factors in society 
such as class, race, and gender. The practice of withdrawing consent is not simplistic for 
individuals suffering from structural oppression, and if the ability to withdraw consent is 
indicative of an individual’s power, then some individuals are more empowered than others. 
Foucault has explored the more complex nature of power and consent in social institutions, 
particularly how individuals collaborate with their own oppression.41 Burrowes argues that 
while much conflict in society is structurally generated, elites are motivated to point away from 
this explanation in order to protect their positions, creating a consciousness problem.42 
McGuiness argues from a feminist standpoint that the consent theory of power does not account 
for women’s experience of power, particularly the way in which patriarchy limits the ability of 
women to consent in society.43 An emphasis on consent as individualistic and voluntary 
obscures the complexity of political, social, and economic life.44 
Further, consent theory assumes that elites require the consent of the governed to achieve their 
                                               
39 Kurt Schock, Civil Resistance Today (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2015), 167. 
40 Ibid., 170. 
41 Atack, Nonviolence in Political Theory, 146-49. 
42 Burrowes, The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense, 52. 
43 Kate McGuinness, "Gene Sharp’s Theory of Power: A Feminist Critique of Consent," Journal of Peace Research 
30, no. 1 (1993). 
44 Nepstad, Nonviolent Struggle, 167. 
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goals. This is not always the case, particularly when people are not the resource that is being 
controlled. Piven and Cloward note that opportunities for defiance are structured by the features 
of institutional life. People cannot defy institutions to which they have no access and to which 
they make no contribution.45 Occupations of foreign territories often depend upon the local 
population in a limited way because it is the material resources of a territory that are sought. 
The failure of the Palestinian Intifada against Israeli occupation is an example of this – the 
consent of the Palestinian people was not needed by the Israeli military to occupy Palestinian 
territory, only the consent of Israelis and the military and political support of the United States 
of America.46 
Nonviolent Dynamic 
How does consent theory lead to nonviolent strategy? There are several key components for 
which pragmatic nonviolent theorists argue. The first is that struggle against the opponent must 
take place on what McAdam and Tarrow term a ‘field of contention’.47 That is, a space and 
using methods that make evident the asymmetry between the violence of the opponent, and the 
nonviolence of the challenger, while creating a dynamic of contention between the two sides in 
a struggle.48 May notes that “[n]onviolence should not be seen as a way to struggle against a 
superior force with inferior means, but instead as a way to shift the ground of struggle so that 
superior military force becomes irrelevant or even a disadvantage”.49 Sharp argues that it is this 
shift that enables the ‘people power’ of nonviolence to have strength against the violence of the 
opponent. Importantly, the dynamic should require a response from the opponent.50 Sharp 
viewed the imposition of sanctions as a sign of a successful challenge by the nonviolent 
resistance, noting that if there were no sanctions applied, this indicated that the nonviolent 
strategy was either small or weak.51 
The second is that Sharp classifies three methods of nonviolent action. Method one is 
nonviolent protest and persuasion. This is symbolic action to try and persuade an opponent 
around to a point of view, such as marches, rallies, vigils. Method two is non-cooperation. This 
                                               
45 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), 23. 
46 Burrowes, The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense, 210-11. 
47 McAdam and Tarrow, "Nonviolence as Contentious Interaction," 153. 
48 Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Part Two: The Methods of Nonviolent Action (Boston, MA: 
Extending Horizons Books, 1973), 109-10. 
49 May, Nonviolent Resistance, 71. 
50 Popovic, Milivojevic, and Djinovic, Nonviolent Struggle 50 Crucial Points, 70. 
51 Gene Sharp, Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential (Boston, MA: 
Extending Horizons Books, 2005), 378. 
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is the withdrawal or withholding of social, economic, or political cooperation, such as strikes 
and boycotts. The last method is nonviolent intervention, which is direct action to prevent the 
opponent from completing some action, such as sit-ins, occupations, blockades, and parallel 
government.52 Schock argues that nonviolent movements should engage in multiple channels 
(institutional and non-institutional), spaces (to limit the impact of repression and maximise the 
leverage potential), and use of all three categories of methods presented by Sharp (since 
methods of protest alone rarely work).53 
The third component is four mechanisms of change which resolve the conflict in the favour of 
the nonviolent resisters. The first is conversion, where the opponent comes around to the point 
of view of the other side. For Gandhi this was the ideal, but Sharp considered this mechanism 
to be unlikely to occur. Second, accommodation, where, through negotiation and compromise, 
the opponent chooses to grant demands and adjust to a new situation without changing their 
viewpoint. Third, coercion, where the opponent, as a result of having their sources of power 
cut, is powerless to prevent change. And lastly disintegration, where the opponent collapses 
completely and effectively ceases to exist, leaving a power vacuum into which the nonviolent 
resister can create new structures of government.54 
The fourth is a process where the power of the opponent is turned against them through 
nonviolent dynamics. Sharp envisaged resisters engaging in one or more of the methods of 
nonviolent action against the opponent. These methods would be carried out on a field of 
contention, where the nonviolent methods of the resister put the opponent at a disadvantage 
through their analysis of the sources of power of the opponent, their assessment of their own 
strengths, weaknesses, the methods chosen, and as a result of using the strength of people power 
rather than the power of violence. 
In this situation nonviolent resistance forces a response from the opponent, either because the 
resisters have intervened to prevent a key component of government from working, or because 
they are losing popular support. That response will come in the form of sanctions. Examples of 
sanctions include control of communications and information, psychological pressures, 
confiscation, economic sanctions, bans and prohibitions, arrests and imprisonment, exceptional 
                                               
52 The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Part One: Power and Struggle, 68-69. 
53 Kurt Schock, Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 164-70. 
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restrictions (new laws, suspension of human rights, martial law), and direct physical violence.55 
Key to the dynamic is the reaction of resisters to sanctions. Sharp states that: 
Faced with repression, nonviolent actionists have only one acceptable response: to 
overcome they must persist in their action and refuse to submit or retreat… Without 
willingness to face repression as the price of struggle, the nonviolent action 
movement cannot hope to succeed.56 
Sharp argued that what caused obedience in this context was not sanctions themselves, but fear 
of the sanctions. It was the threat that caused people to cease their nonviolent resistance, 
returning to a compliant state. A sanction itself could not force people to cease most forms of 
resistance.57 
If resisters were to back down at this stage of the struggle, it would cause a loss of public 
support, and encourage the opponent to use sanctions when challenged in the future.58 On the 
other hand, if the nonviolent resisters remained strong and continued their actions, this would 
lead to an increase in public support, loss of support for the opponent, an increased number of 
people joining the campaign, increased morale, and an awareness for the opponent that 
sanctions are not effective.59 Most importantly, the actions have to remain nonviolent, often in 
the face of attempts by the opponent to push them to violence by agent provocateurs. This 
discipline or resilience is recognised by several researchers as key because it delegitimises the 
actions of the opponent, and gains credibility, support, and ultimately power for the resisters.60 
This nonviolent discipline in the face of sanctions causes a backfire effect which Sharp termed 
‘political jiu jitsu’. Sharp describes the process as “…shifts in opinion and then shifts in power 
relationships favourable to the nonviolent group. These shifts result from withdrawal of support 
for the opponent and the grant of support to the nonviolent actionists”.61 This phenomenon is 
key to the success of Sharp’s pragmatic nonviolence. It is the point at which the choice of 
nonviolence and the discipline to maintain it cause support to shift to the resisting group and 
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the mechanisms of change begin to come into play. The opponent is forced into conversion, 
accommodation, coerced into making a change, or disintegrates altogether. 
Outcomes of Nonviolence 
How does nonviolent theory perform in practice? Stephan and Chenoweth investigated 323 
civil resistance campaigns from 1900-2006. They found that nonviolent campaigns were twice 
as likely to be successful than violent campaigns. They argued that this was because a 
commitment to nonviolence gave movements domestic and international legitimacy and 
increased participation in the movement, while violence against nonviolent movements tended 
to backfire.62 Nonviolent movements in particular were six times as likely to succeed in the face 
of violent repression.63 Loyalty shifts amongst security forces were particularly influential as a 
success factor.64 Further, a broad movement base not reliant on a single leader made movements 
more difficult to repress.65 Nepstad further researched some of these issues via case studies, 
confirming that security force defections were crucial for the success of a nonviolent 
movement.66 But I note that these studies have all considered nonviolent movements seeking 
state-wide regime change, not the liberal-democratic policy change that the Waihopai campaign 
is seeking. 
Nonviolent Alternatives 
What alternatives are there to this theory? The most significant alternative is Gandhian 
principled nonviolence. How would this differ from Sharpian pragmatic nonviolence? First, 
there would be an increased focus upon self-improvement, particularly the application of 
nonviolence in all areas of life.67 Second, there would be a programme of constructive 
nonviolence – creating new, non-oppressing structures while seeking to tear down the 
oppressive ones.68 Third, the mechanism of change would be focused upon conversion, with 
nonviolent action becoming a method of negotiation and the suffering of nonviolent resisters 
becoming a way of both sides reaching a common understanding of what change was needed.69 
Last, there would be an increased focus upon means, and applying principles to them, rather 
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than having principled goals, but using any means to achieve them.70 
Theorists have taken mixtures of Sharp’s pragmatic nonviolence and Gandhi’s more principled 
approach and tried to create a strategy that better suits their belief systems. Vinthagen put 
forward ‘constructive resistance’, involving nonviolent training and ways of life, including a 
constructive programme, dialogue facilitation to manage competing truths between opposing 
groups, principled enactment including care for the opponent and use of political jiu jitsu as a 
method, and power-breaking through symbolism, non-cooperation, humour, and the 
undermining of oppressive power relationships.71 This understanding of nonviolence led to him 
participating in ploughshare actions and attempts to break the blockade of the Gaza Strip.72 
Shock calls for a recognition of principled and pragmatic nonviolence as a continuum rather 
than two distinct categories, as even primarily pragmatic campaigns will tend to incorporate 
elements, beliefs, and processes that are normally classified as principled.73 
Sabotage 
The question of sabotage or property damage is one that raises considerable discussion in 
nonviolent theories, and is particularly relevant to the case study of this thesis. Sharp was clear 
in his classification of sabotage for political purposes. While it was not normally violent in 
nature, it did not fit within his theory of nonviolence. He argued that it would weaken a 
nonviolent movement through the use of secrecy rather than openness, limiting the participation 
of nonviolent resisters to a few, and move the field of contention from between human beings, 
to between human beings and physical objects. Consent was no longer being withdrawn to 
prevent the system working, sabotage sought to intervene in the system by damaging 
components of it instead.74 
Conclusion 
I will now summarise this chapter into a checklist against which to compare the case study. 
First, for the campaign to be considered nonviolent it must be collective action, active rather 
than passive in nature, undertaken outside the formal institution of the state, and avoid the use 
of all types of violence. Second, for it to be assessed against Sharp’s theories it must be 
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pragmatic in nature, with a focus on end goals, seeking to win against the opponent primarily 
through accommodation or coercion rather than persuade them to change their minds through 
conversion. Third, the consent theory of power needs to be applicable. Given the criticism of 
Sharp in this area, that consent will need to be voluntarily given, rather than structurally 
imposed. There must be pillars of support for the opponent which could be removed through 
the protesters’ powers of leverage.  
Then what factors will I use to assess the campaign? The fourth item on the checklist is, was it 
contested on a field of contention which highlighted the asymmetry of the violence of the 
opponent and the nonviolence of the resisters, where people power has the greatest impact? The 
fifth and sixth are, which of the three methods of nonviolence (protest and persuasion, non-
cooperation, nonviolent intervention) did it use and were these methods likely to engage any of 
the four mechanisms of change (conversion, accommodation, coercion, disintegration)? 
Seventh, did the nonviolent resistance force a response from the opponent, and eighth, how did 
the resistance react to that response. Ninth, did ‘political jiu jitsu’ take place where a nonviolent 
response to repression empowered the resisters. In light of principled nonviolence, our tenth 
item will be asking whether adopting this approach may have led to better outcomes. Last, the 
effectiveness of sabotage as part of a nonviolent campaign will be our eleventh topic. 




Chapter Two: Thirty Years of Protest 
against Waihopai Spy Base 
On 2 December 1987, the New Zealand Prime Minister, David Lange, released a press 
statement announcing that a “defence satellite communication station” would be constructed in 
the Waihopai Valley near Blenheim, with construction to begin in 1988 and the station to 
become operational in 1989. The station would be wholly New Zealand-owned and controlled, 
and was a significant step in government policy to become more self-reliant in defence (New 
Zealand’s Nuclear Free policy had seen it dropped from the Australia, New Zealand, United 
States Security Treaty (ANZUS) alliance earlier that year).75 Since that date, the station has 
been vigorously opposed by a small section of the New Zealand population. This chapter will 
outline the history and strategies of this campaign. 
First, some information on the base and its activities will be presented, and then a background 
to the peace movement in New Zealand at that time. Then the campaign against the base will 
be outlined, starting with protests at the site. Then the broader campaign will be explored, 
including education, international links, research, the courts, and traditional political action. 
What is Waihopai? 
Waihopai spybase is a satellite spying station managed by the Government Communication 
Security Bureau (GCSB). Initially the station had one dish and could only track one satellite at 
a time. The addition of a second dish in 1998, and then further ‘torus’ dishes this century mean 
that the station can now track up to twenty satellites simultaneously. Waihopai’s sister station, 
Tangimoana, near Bulls in the North Island, is a maritime radio tracking station, particularly 
focused on military signals. By contrast, Waihopai tracks civilian satellites, intercepting phone 
calls, faxes, emails, and internet traffic.76 It is part of a world-wide network of bases operating 
under the secret UKUSA agreement, with the United States of America, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand participating.77 
There is considerable dispute in the differences between the official statements of the GCSB 
                                               
75 David Lange, "Defence Satellite Communications Station," News Release, 1987. 
76 Nicky Hager, Secret Power (Nelson: Craig Potton Publishing, 1996), 166. 
77 Ibid., 21-22. 
17 
 
and the government about what the station does with this capability, versus the claims of leaked 
documents, researchers, and protesters. The government line is: 
New Zealand’s signals intelligence collection facilities are managed and controlled 
by the GCSB alone and that access by New Zealand’s intelligence partners to those 
facilities and to the intelligence material collected is at all times under the control 
and supervision of the GCSB.78 
The government has always claimed that the station does not spy on New Zealanders, and that 
the information collected is used for New Zealand intelligence purposes rather than being 
controlled by foreign powers. Those opposed to the base claim that it collects and stores all 
communications, regardless of citizenship of the author, sifting through them for keywords, and 
storing metadata for later searches, and that the multi-country system is used to get around legal 
restrictions within state boundaries.79 It is not within the scope of this thesis to try and analyse 
the reality of this debate. I do however note that over the past thirty years the government has 
admitted many of the claims made by protesters, while more are backed up by documents 
released by Edward Snowden, but denied by the New Zealand government.80 
New Zealand Peace Movement 
What was the status of the peace movement that sought to oppose this new base? The New 
Zealand peace movement had strong pacifist traditions going back to the time of World War 
One, and was increasing empowered to challenge the practice of New Zealand blindly following 
American foreign policy, particularly since the Vietnam War was opposed by a nationwide 
protest movement.81 Particularly significant by the mid-1980s was a strong anti-nuclear 
movement. This had origins in the groups Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the 
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, along with an awareness of the horrors 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. By the 1970s, the peace movement was actively opposing nuclear 
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ship visits to New Zealand, as well as nuclear testing in the Pacific. The divisive Springbok 
Tour in 1981 saw large scale civil disobedience across the country which served to radicalise 
many activists.82 
A full range of campaigning tactics were used by the movement. Peace activists supported 
flotilla that opposed French nuclear testing at Mururoa from 1972-1995. The protesting boats 
and crew explicitly employed nonviolent techniques such as putting themselves inside the 
danger zone of radioactive fallout, and then resisting French marines taking over their vessel 
by cutting tow lines and by crew members throwing themselves into the water.83 Local peace 
groups, coordinated by the Nuclear Free Zone Committee, and Peacelink, a national magazine, 
campaigned to turn local bodies and cities into nuclear free zones.84 By 1986 72 percent of New 
Zealanders lived in 104 local body nuclear weapon free zones.85 When the government invited 
American nuclear ships to New Zealand to maintain military links, land-based pickets and 
seafarers strikes were joined by a “Peace Squadron”, a diverse mixture of small boats that 
sought to block nuclear ships from accessing the harbours in Auckland and Wellington.86 The 
Squadron’s policy statement outlined its explicitly nonviolent goals: “The Peace Squadron will 
absolutely refrain from violence at all times… We will support other groups in their non-violent 
actions to prevent the entry into New Zealand of nuclear weapons”.87 
With the election of the Labour government under a nuclear free policy in 1984, significant 
pressure came upon Prime Minister David Lange from within New Zealand and internationally 
to not implement the policy in order to keep New Zealand in ANZUS.88 The peace movement 
response was to attempt to bolster the government’s determination through lobbying, public 
education campaigns, and protests at military exercises. As the campaign broadened, diverse 
groups lent their support: the National Council of Women, unions, and professional peace 
bodies such as doctors, pharmacists, lawyers, physicists, artists and musicians.89 An increased 
prominence of indigenous peoples and awareness of the impacts of nuclear testing upon the 
Pacific led to a focus on an independent and nuclear free Pacific, and New Zealand was a 
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driving force behind the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty in 1985.90 The New Zealand 
Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act passed in 1987, and by the early 1990s 
was accepted broadly across the political spectrum.91 
In relation to foreign bases on New Zealand soil, there had been long-standing campaigns 
against several sites, starting during the Vietnam War at Mount John near Tekapo, Woodbourne 
and Black Birch near Blenheim, and Harewood and Weedons in Christchurch.92 Following its 
discovery by peace researcher Owen Wilkes in 1984, Tangimoana, which opened in 1982, was 
added to this list.93 These campaigns had largely been unsuccessful, but a proposal to build an 
Omega base (for submarine navigation) in Christchurch in 1968 was exposed by CANTA 
magazine, and large protests led to it being built in Australia instead. These were the first 
campaigns to link the presence of US military bases to concerns about New Zealand being a 
nuclear target, and many peace activists linked the campaign against foreign bases to New 
Zealand being nuclear free.94 With most of these bases situated in the South Island, there was a 
strong core of activists based in Christchurch coordinating many of the campaigns against them, 
initially under the umbrella of Campaign Against Foreign Military Activities in New Zealand 
(formed in 1972), then renamed as Campaign against Foreign Control in New Zealand in 1975, 
with Aotearoa replacing New Zealand in the name from 1986. The Anti-Bases Campaign 
(ABC), which has driven much of the protest against Waihopai, was formed in 1987 from this 
group.95 
It is from this context that the campaign against Waihopai spy base was launched. A strong 
peace movement, flush with success at making New Zealand nuclear free, driven by an 
increased foreign policy independence from traditional allies such as the United States, and 
experienced at testing out nonviolent strategies and tactics in a variety of contexts, including, 
without great success, foreign bases. 
Nonviolent Protest Against Waihopai 
Planning for protest at Waihopai began shortly after the December 1987 announcement that it 
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was to be built, and well before construction began. The base was discussed at the National 
Peace Workshops a fortnight after the announcement. Campaigners noted that:  
Bases do not engender the strong feelings that warships invading our harbours do. 
This is part of the problem we face. The bases may be just as important as the ship 
visits but the issues are more complex and often technical. They don’t involve 
nuclear weapons directly so people miss the connection between the bases and the 
insidious nuclear war-fighting strategies dominating the US global view.96 
Despite these concerns they hoped that a broader campaign against foreign bases would 
generate the same support and momentum as the anti-nuclear issue had. Nicky Hager, at that 
time a researcher with Peace Movement Aotearoa, believed that the government only months 
earlier had been opposed to building a base, but had come under considerable pressure from its 
UKUSA intelligence partners. “The Government does not really believe in what it is doing. The 
base is not required for New Zealand’s security. We must rapidly build up public opposition 
before it is built”.97 
The first protests on the site took place two months later in February, with over 150 protesters 
gathering. A large peace symbol the size of the intended satellite dish was painted on the ground 
in whitewash. A Wellington women’s peace group called Limit called for the money set aside 
to build the base to be redirected towards building houses for homeless families, planting 366 
cardboard houses on the site.98 
With construction beginning in May of that year, protesters stepped up their activities. Five 
activists were arrested early on 2 May after chaining themselves to construction equipment. 
Spokesman Fergus Wheeler indicated that the nonviolent civil disobedience was nothing 
compared to the illegality of the base, stating that “We have no option but to increase the 
intensity of protest until public opinion makes it impossible for the Government to proceed”.99 
Two weeks later 150 demonstrators marched onto the site, decorating a security fence around 
the area under construction with banners. They then moved past the fence, carrying rocks from 
around the site to form a large ‘NO’ and covering over survey pegs. They returned to the site 
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again later that weekend and played ‘Anti-baseball’.100 
Up until this point, protesters had gathered from across the country on weekends, camping not 
far from the construction site. However a group of women, inspired by the Greenham Common 
women’s camp, which some of them had visited, formed a women’s peace camp on the land of 
a sympathetic farmer nearby. The camp gave the protest movement a more permanent base, the 
opportunity to engage in protests during weekdays when contractors were working, and local 
residents were encouraged to come speak to the women about the base.101 Initially planned for 
a week between protest weekends, the camp stayed on site for four months, and was only 
eventually shut down when the local council served them with a notice for lack of facilities.102  
A report on a later women’s camp provides an indication of what this women’s-only action 
brought to the campaign: a focus on the education of each other, a redefinition of peace away 
from a narrow view of the absence of war to a consideration of the absence of patriarchal 
violence, and a recognition of indigenous views and struggles.103 From 8-10 July a nonviolent 
action training weekend was held.104 
The women engaged in women-only actions at the site. In that first week thirty protesters 
occupied the site, decorating it with flowers, streamers, and balloons, and three women secured 
themselves to machinery.105 When contractors arrived they came into conflict with the 
protesters, and the women claimed that they used the machinery to intimidate them. May Bass 
was driven around the site when she refused to get off the roof of a digger. Three protesters 
were arrested.106 This protest was supplemented by a march through Blenheim, and a public 
meeting.107 The camp was briefly reinstated in December and seven women used a vehicle to 
drive through the gate, occupying the guard hut at the base for an hour. While inside they 
phoned the Prime Minister’s office in an unsuccessful attempt to get him to answer questions 
about the base. All were arrested.108 
A third national weekend of action took place in late August. By this time access to the site was 
secured by a security fence, and protesters distracted police and security at their rally at the 
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front gate, while another group approached the base from the rear, cutting through the fence 
and occupying the site. Members of the rally then lifted the gate off its hinges to join the 
occupation.109 The final national action of the year was in November. A first day of protest was 
low-key, with protesters having a picnic inside the base. The following day six protesters used 
ladders to scale the security fence at 4.30am and were arrested.110 
There was also some property damaged in this early period to try and slow down construction 
of the base. At the end of May about 500 metres of low fencing was cut down, and in June 
power cables were dug up and cut.111 
Not all actions took place locally. Limit replanted its houses on parliament’s lawn, and then 
again in Auckland in support of a protest march. 112 On 16 March they presented a late tender 
for the base to the Wellington-based GCSB in the form of a giant envelope that opened into the 
shape of a house.113 On 9 June a group of protesters dressed as spies occupied the lift foyer of 
the Freyberg building that housed the GCSB headquarters in Wellington, preventing the lifts 
working for an hour.114 A fortnight later two students scaled the outside of the building in 
protest, while a banner reading “Stop Waihopai Spy Base” was unfurled from the top of the 
building opposite.115 In July members of the women’s camp crossed Cook Strait and held a two 
day vigil outside parliament, and five of the women stood up in parliament’s gallery with the 
words “NO SPY” printed on t-shirts.116 
At this early stage of the campaign, with construction going on at the base, and with the 
women’s camp acting as a constant presence, the protest campaign had been relatively 
successful. Attention was being placed upon the GCSB, its secret nature, the legality of the 
decision by the government to build the base, the cost and the alternative uses to which the 
money could be put, and the civil rights of citizens and their right to privacy in their 
communications. Several peace groups across the country were supporting this work, both by 
attending central protests, but also working locally. Overall, the first year of the campaign had 
been relatively intensive, had engaged a significant proportion of the peace movement, and had 
achieved considerable media attention and public awareness, while failing to make any 
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significant changes to government decisions and the construction of the base. 
As the campaign entered its second year, it began to be influenced by the increasing reality of 
the base. The first national protest of the year broke through security fences again, with activists 
claiming they had identified ten large containers on the site as containing the components of 
the satellite dish, made in Houston, Texas.117 Protesters returned in May and, influenced by the 
discussions of Wellington activists who had plotted on the ferry over, invaded the base in the 
middle of the night, cutting holes in the security fence, spraying graffiti on the containers, and 
occupying the operations building. Protesters confirmed that the building contained American 
and British equipment.118 The GCSB threatened to increase security at the base in response.119 
The next day protesters returned to the base without breaching the fence and read a people’s 
declaration on Waihopai: 
We the people of Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
In a time of unprecedented unemployment and social disruption, declare the 
expenditure of untold millions of dollars on this Waihopai spy base establishment 
to be indefensible. 
If the government persists in building this spy base we intend to make it 
indefensible. 
In recognition of the citizens’ rights to access to and control of this land for the 
benefit of all free peoples, we hereby declare this fence open.120 
Wellington continued to be a focus. On 21 February five hundred women surrounded the 
Beehive on parliament grounds in a ‘Waihopai hug’, to protest against government expenditure 
on the base and new frigates.121 However activities in other centres began to die down. 
The next protest, in August, was the first at which the satellite dish and covering radome (this 
is the ‘golf ball’ like cover) were up, and protesters decided “as the NZ people had been fed 
concentrated bullshit about Waihopai” that they would throw cow dung in a ‘bulls-hitting’ 
competition at both the radome and security cameras.122 Warren Thomson of the ABC, 
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reporting on the event, noted that: 
The base is by no means invulnerable, but maybe it is time to look harder at wider 
lobbying, to better inform an ignorant population of the puffball cancer that has 
been secretly grafted onto the Waihopai plain. As well as more action, of course – 
the weekend was too much fun to persuade anyone to give up direct action.123 
This is the first acknowledgement of the increasing difficulty of engaging in direct action 
against a spy base with high levels of physical and legal security. 
The last significant protest for the year took place in November. By this time the base had been 
officially opened the Prime Minister. Unable to get into the base, there was consternation about 
what to do next and how to coordinate a successful national campaign against the base,124 and 
this debate was to affect strategies over the coming years. 
In 1990 there was only one significant protest at the base, in May. Around fifty protesters 
blockaded two of the gates to the facility, seeking to prevent a shift change. However GCSB 
staff were able to eventually enter with police assistance and the use of a neighbouring farm 
gate. Protesters also sought to camp and light fires on the base property, and 38 were physically 
removed that evening by police, but not arrested.125 
Direct actions at Waihopai during these first three years were normally accompanied by a rally 
or march in Blenheim, and often a public information evening. While there was some local 
opposition to the base, there is little indication of this becoming widespread. Activists attending 
the protest were more likely to be from other centres, and the local newspaper, the Marlborough 
Express, editorialised several times over this period recognising the right to protest, but 
generally expressing support for the base and its construction.126 
The following years were difficult for the campaign. A change of government to the National 
Party in 1990 saw no change in policy on the base, its activities, or the secrecy around it. A 
January 1991 protest sought to draw links between Waihopai and the recently begun Gulf War, 
with two protesters arrested. A protest in November 1992 attracted only 30 participants, and 
was the first to engage in no direct action at the base, with a symbolic protest and information 
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session conducted at the gate.127 1993 saw no significant action at the base at all, and in 1994 
the women’s camp was revived for a week in the buildup to a weekend of protest, at which nine 
people were arrested, two for cutting through fences, and seven for breach of the peace. Some 
protesters danced naked outside the base with ‘Uncover the Spybase’ painted on their chests.128 
A letter to the base director was also delivered, outlining objections to the base, explicitly 
referencing a broad understanding of nonviolence, incorporating environmental sustainability, 
social services, self-determination, community, healing, love and understanding.129 
A report by Jo Buchanan on this 1994 protest outlines some of the complications that protesters 
faced internally. The weekend began with a meeting, debating firstly whether the group present 
could decide for those still to arrive what would be undertaken, or whether nonviolent actions 
had to be collectively decided. Once a plan was agreed on, protesters allocated themselves to 
three groups – a diversion group, and two groups who would try to enter the base. Within each 
group protesters had to further divide themselves depending on whether they were willing to 
get arrested, or under what conditions they would be happy to be arrested. The appearance of a 
suspicious looking protester at the last minute led to debates about whether he might be an 
undercover cop.130 Once the groups split, the presence of ‘Ralph’, a well-known police officer 
who rode his horse at protests, caused further complications. Although the group was able to 
cut through the fence, as soon as they entered the base they were arrested so quickly that 
someone suggested that they might as well back the paddy wagon up to the fence so that people 
could climb straight in. Later that night an evaluation meeting assessed the process of the 
previous twenty-four hours, but without any useful resolution that could be carried forward.131 
Despite these complications, the 1994 protest was noted to be the most successful in some years. 
A resurgence of youth involvement, and the involvement of McGillicuddy Serious Party 
activists were indications of the revival of interest in Waihopai. 
The activities of the Christchurch-based ABC, now sole driver for the campaign, fell into a 
regular rhythm. For each year from 1994 until 2018 there would be a late January protest, with 
the exceptions of 1998, 1999, 2002, 2005, and 2009. For the rest of the 1990s these would take 
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on a symbolic struggle as protesters largely engaged in conflict with police rather than with the 
GCSB or government. 
In 1995, after one protester was arrested for dashing through the gate, protesters claim that they 
were leaving when police arrested one of activists appointed as a police liaison. The protesters 
met at their camp and agreed that a small group would return to raise this breach of protocol 
with police. Two female activists, who felt that the police belittled their gender and threatened 
them at that subsequent meeting, volunteered to be arrested, which the police subsequently did. 
Nonviolence trainer Alan Cumming was outraged by this breach of police procedure, and 
returned to the base for a third time, delivering a letter of complaint to police.132 
The protests in 1996 and 1997 were focused around protesters seeking to reclaim their right to 
walk up to the main gate of the base, over Ministry of Defence property, as they had done for 
almost a decade, and against police restricting their activities to the farm gate on the road side. 
In 1996 six were arrested for attempting to approach the base.133 In 1997 twenty protesters were 
arrested for trespass, the largest number of any protest in the campaign.134 
1997 was the last time that the campaign encouraged civil disobedience and mass arrests. In 
November 1998 the ABC held a national strategy meeting to consider political lobbying vs 
protest actions. In part, it was a recognition of the ongoing failure of their direct actions. Bob 
Leonard noted that “The Anti-Bases Campaign has yet to come up with a foolproof plan for an 
annual demonstration that will close Waihopai for good. So we usually make our pilgrimage to 
the base in order to protest, a negative activity by definition”.135 Murray Horton explained (in 
2006) that “In the years of mass arrests and confrontations out at the base, we tended to ignore 
Blenheim, and generated hostility as a result. Now our relationship with the local people and 
media is very positive”.136 
For the next decade the annual protests would follow a familiar theme. A rally and/or march in 
town, with speakers and often a sausage sizzle to encourage the locals to talk to the activists 
would be followed by a visit to the base for more speeches, and often theatre for the media. A 
common tactic was activist Bob Leonard dressed as ‘Uncle Sam’ issuing passports for the 
‘Undemocratic Republic of UKUSA’ as people neared the base. There were also best dressed 
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spy competitions, spies picnics, and the use of large paper mache puppets of American and New 
Zealand political leaders.137 Interestingly, the removal of civil disobedience from the toolbox 
led to the GCSB agreeing that protesters could again approach and protest outside the main 
gate, rather than on the main road. This change of tactics was not without opposition. In 2007 
Steffan Browning called for a return to direct action citing the ineffectiveness of the educational 
approach.138 
Shortly after this change of tactics came a change in emphasis. Previously the civil liberties of 
people in New Zealand and the Pacific and their right not to be spied on had been emphasised. 
With the election of George W. Bush as President of the United States, the terrorist incident on 
9/11, and the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the protests became more explicitly anti-war, 
particularly the role of the base in collecting intelligence for coalition military forces and how 
it tied New Zealand into military alliances that New Zealanders believed were no longer 
active.139 The 2003 protest, which occurred in the buildup to the invasion of Iraq, drew over 
200 attendees.140 
Changes in tactics, focus, and international events however did not change the number of locals 
attending. In 2006 though over a hundred attended the annual protest, the low number from 
Blenheim was described by organisers as ‘woeful’.141 In 2006 the Press concluded that the 
station was regarded by the locals as more of an “oddball landmark than any serious threat to 
personal rights”.142 
On 30 April 2008, the campaign witnessed its most significant event, and most decisive action. 
Members of the Catholic Workers, who had attended the January 2008 protest as an opportunity 
to ‘scope out’ the base and its security, returned to perform a ploughshares action. Ploughshares 
actions were started in 1980 by American Catholic anti-war activists Daniel and Philip 
Berrigan, and are religious and nonviolent actions, often involving blood and normally a 
physical action to disable weapons. A key component of the philosophy is remaining at the site 
of the action and facing legal consequences.143 
All three members (Peter Murnane, Adrian Leason, and Sam Land) of ‘The Domebusters’, as 
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they came to be called, later testified that they were struck by the ineffectiveness of the last 
twenty years of ABC protests, and “how this had convinced them that they had [to] go further 
than protest, they had to take non-violent direct action”.144 Their spokesperson, Manu Caddie 
commented that “Sometimes direct action can draw attention to the issue in ways the annual 
ABC get together might not. Hopefully it will stir up action about the issue”.145 
They originally intended to use a truck and hoist to lift themselves over the various fences 
securing the facility, however this plan was thwarted when they drove the vehicle into a ditch. 
They then proceeded by foot, using tools to cut through the three layers of fences, and then 
sickles to cut through the radome that covered the satellite. They then prayed until they were 
arrested. While held in police cells, two began a fast which finished only when they were 
released five days later.146 
Murnane explained the motivation for their actions. They saw accepting the government 
explanation that Waihopai was making the world a better place as naïve. “We had publicly 
questioned the deceptions and pretence of those who claim to protect us, but by their violence 
are making it even harder to achieve a peaceful world”.147 Leason explained that their research 
had connected the activities in the Waihopai base to the system that was engaging in war in 
Iraq, and that shutting down this component of that system might stop a piece of intelligence 
being used to kill Iraqis. Land was motivated by a picture of an Iraqi holding a child killed in a 
coalition air strike.148 All three made explicit reference in public and court statements to their 
actions and philosophy as nonviolent. 
The response to the action was polarising. Prime Minister Helen Clark called it “senseless 
vandalism”. GCSB Director Bruce Ferguson said that the Bureau was “embarrassed”.149 Blue 
Derry, the farmer whose land they had crossed to access the site condemned their action, as did 
many locals.150 Letters to the Marlborough Express over the following week were largely in 
opposition to the action and called for the activists to pay for the damage, and this disapproval 
was repeated following their trial in 2010, and the ABC protests in 2011 and 2012. The ABC, 
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which had no prior knowledge of the action, called it a “brilliant and courageous action”.151 
Peace Action Wellington, a group following nonviolent protest methods in the capital, 
organised a march in support, popping white balloons.152 
The action not only put the dish out of action for a short period, but also exposed the hidden 
dish to observation. Measurements made in 2009 determined that it was pointing at Japanese, 
Chinese, Russian and Vietnamese satellites which provided phone, data, internet and television 
connections.153 
While the ploughshares action generated significant debate across New Zealand, it did not lead 
to an increased number of protesters at the following annual events. In 2010 only about twenty 
attended, and a local staged a counter-protest.154 In 2011 Peter Murnane returned for a protest 
of forty people, and four counter-protesters handed him a bill for $1.1 million on behalf of New 
Zealand’s ‘silent majority’.155 Steffan Browning commented that the Domebusters action had 
caused a backlash against protesters in Blenheim who heckled them when they marched through 
town and were less likely to take protest literature.156 By 2012 fifty protesters attending was 
enough for the Marlborough Express to claim that there was ‘new blood’, inspired by previous 
protests.157 In 2013 the protest was again small, but protesters for the first time in five years 
attempted to cross Ministry of Defence property to present a letter to the GCSB at the gate. The 
letter called for the government to release the names of people illegally spied on by the 
GCSB.158 
By 2014 however, recent protests against changes to the laws governing the GCSB saw an 
increase in attendance at the protest, with over seventy present.159 Similar numbers attended in 
2015, 2016, and 2017 with no significant civil disobedience occurring. 
The history of protest at the base passed through three distinct phases. The initial phase covered 
the period of construction and first year of operation, when there were frequent protests, 
occupations of the site, and damage to the base to either slow construction or gain access for 
the purpose of occupation. The women’s camp added a unique element to part of this period, 
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providing both a constant presence and a different challenge to the militancy of the base. These 
were complemented with protests at other parts of the country, particularly in Wellington, 
where parliament provided a focus. 
The second phase began in 1990, and carried through until 1997. During this phase, the physical 
nature of the base provided a challenge to protesters that they struggled to overcome with 
nonviolence. Protests focused on access to the main gate of the base and confrontations with 
police, rather than the base itself. Protests in other locations ceased during this phase. 
The third phase began in 1998, and has run for the past two decades. Protests have adopted a 
more educational and persuasive tone, there is very little nonviolent direct action. Keeping the 
local population educated about the base and onside with the protesters is a major focus. The 
aberration in this phase is the 2008 Domebusters attack on the base, which adopted a nonviolent 
ploughshares philosophy and used secrecy and property destruction to directly attack the 
institution. This was very polarising and unpopular in much of the community, but achieved 
significant publicity for the campaign. 
While protest was a significant part of the campaign, it was supported by a number of other 
activities, to which I will now turn. 
Education 
In the initial stages of the campaign, peace groups nationwide sought to inform the public in 
their area through such activities as stalls, talks, and video evenings. The local education 
campaigns were supported by a caravan in which Jim Chapple toured the country from August 
1988. He spent four days at the Labour Party national conference in Dunedin talking to 
delegates and Members of Parliament. Over seven months the caravan visited 72 towns or cities, 
with 47 school visits, 26 evening meetings, 31 radio interviews, 46 newspaper reports, 56 street 
days with display boards set up, and 11,000 leaflets distributed.160 As activity outside of 
Blenheim fell away after the first few years, the ABC sought to keep knowledge of the base 
alive. In 1998 Warren Thomson spent several weeks travelling around the country and giving 
talks. This was repeated by Murray Horton in 2014. A passive display was also made available 
for local exhibitions at public meetings, libraries, and stalls.161 
                                               
160 Jim Chapple, "Completion of the Waihopai Caravan’s National Tour," Peacelink 71 (1989). 
161 Murray Horton, "National Speaking Tour Pamphlet," in Peace Researcher, ed. Anti-Bases Campaign 




Throughout the last thirty years the ABC has sought to build links and share information with 
the international anti-bases community. The ABC has close links with the Australian Anti-
Bases Campaign Coalition, with New Zealand activists attending their protests, and vice-versa. 
An announcement that Australian Midnight Oil singer and future Green Senator Peter Garrett 
would visit the site to join the February 1988 protest proved to be premature – Garrett had not 
coordinated his plans with the requirements of the band’s tour.162 In 1989 Australian senator Jo 
Vallentine visited the base, stating that she felt that the base would damage New Zealand’s 
reputation in the Pacific.163 Much of 1990 was spent preparing for a ‘Touching the Bases’ tour, 
which took in Tangimoana, ‘secret’ Wellington, Waihopai, Black Birch, and Harewood in 
Christchurch. The tour was an attempt to build international links, both with peace activists in 
other countries with similar bases, and with indigenous people for whom military bases 
represented another step in the colonial process. Representatives from around New Zealand and 
the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Australia, and America attended the week long tour.164 
The January 1994 protest was timed to coincide with a women’s peace camp and blockade at 
Menwith Hill spy base in the UK.165 In 2005, a group of peace activists from Kobe, Japan were 
guided to the base by Christchurch activists166 and in 2008 Filipino peace activist Cora Fabros 
toured New Zealand and visited Waihopai.167  
International experts were also used to talk about the echelon system. British investigative 
journalist Duncan Campbell spent time in New Zealand in 1997168 and former Canadian signals 
intelligence officer Mike Frost in 2001.169 
Research 
Research was a significant part of the campaign. The secret nature of the Waihopai base meant 
that information was not readily available to protesters. Early research was done by peace 
researcher Owen Wilkes, who provided much of the initial analysis of the nature of the base 
and its likely activity and satellite targets. The campaign got a significant boost in August 1996 
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when Nicky Hager released Secret Power. The book, based in part on internal GCSB documents 
and interviews with anonymous GCSB staff, attracted considerable attention within New 
Zealand and overseas. Media attention within New Zealand included current affairs show 20/20, 
where Hager and journalist John Campbell slipped into the base and filmed the operations room 
through gaps in the curtain.170 Hager was invited to testify before the European Parliament’s 
temporary committee on Echelon in 2001.171 While the government response was again to 
refuse to respond, a lot of attention was paid to the foreword to Hager’s book written by former 
Prime Minister David Lange: 
But it was not until I read this book that I had any idea that we had been committed 
to an international integrated electronic network… an astonishing number of people 
have told him [Hager] things that I, as Prime Minister in charge of the intelligence 
services, was never told.172 
In early 2006 a journalist found a top-secret GCSB report accidentally filed amongst Lange’s 
papers at the National Archives. This led to the Sunday Star Times publishing a list of countries 
and organisations that were targeted by the GCSB, confirming the ongoing links that the GCSB 
had with US intelligence agencies, and showing that the US had threatened to spy on New 
Zealand because of its anti-nuclear stance.173 This led to the unprecedented step of GCSB 
Director Warren Tucker releasing a statement which was reprinted in full in the media, denying 
that the organisation had ever kept Prime Ministers in the dark and arguing that the UKUSA 
agreement provided many positive benefits for New Zealand.174 
In 2013 the NSA documents released by Edward Snowden compounded the pressure on the 
government. Detailing the nature and tools of the Five Eyes network, the documents presented 
Waihopai (called ‘Ironsand’ in the documents) as just one base in a borderless spying system, 
which ‘collected it all, processed it all’. The documents indicated that countries would spy on 
each other’s citizens to get around local laws, giving governments plausible deniability that 
they were not spying on their own citizens. Specific revelations were information about 
XKeyScore, which collected internet browsing, PRISM, which pulled user data from major 
software companies and internet service providers, and Speargun, which tapped undersea 
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internet cables.175 Hager’s collaboration with The Intercept and local newspapers eventually 
brought the New Zealand involvement to light in 2015.176 Gallager and Hager argue that in 
2009 Waihopai was upgraded to ‘full take’ collection, sweeping up communications 
indiscriminately, which are then accessible across the Five Eyes network.177 
The Snowden revelations seemed to provide evidence for exactly what campaigners against 
Waihopai had been claiming it did all along. The government again refused to clarify what the 
base did as part of the Five Eyes network, but insisted that it acted legally.178 Prime Minister 
John Key claimed that he had had a proposal put in front of him for Speargun in March 2013, 
and had decided not to go ahead because it was ‘too broad’. However in 2017 New Zealand 
Herald journalist David Fisher revealed that the project had only been abandoned in 2014 after 
Key was briefed that details of the project were likely to become public.179 
Research provided significant momentum for the campaign. Indeed often it was the only thing 
that was able to break through the government’s deniability of the GCSB’s activities. However 
an inability of the campaign to translate the impact of research to large numbers of participants 
in the campaign remained a problem. Much of the information was of great interest to the media, 
who pursued the government mercilessly, but did not have widespread impact amongst the New 
Zealand population. 
Legal Processes 
Protesters also used the court processes to attempt to seek information from and prosecute the 
GCSB. For trespass charges to be pressed, the legal owner of the site had to appear and confirm 
that authority had been given to the police to remove protesters. This meant that GCSB officers 
were often the first people to testify in court hearings, and they would be asked about the use 
of information collected at the base and international links to foreign agencies. In 1989 the 
seven women arrested for occupying the guard hut used this tactic unsuccessfully.180 In 1997 
Peter Williams QC, representing twenty arrested protesters, sought to subpoena Glen Singleton, 
a National Security Agency employee working at the GCSB, but this was refused by the 
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Arrested protesters and their legal representation often argued that they should not be convicted 
due to legal or higher moral reasons. In 1996 three protesters arrested for trespass presented a 
defence that the GCSB acted in contravention of the Bill of Rights and under the Trespass Act 
they were entitled to be at the base to protect themselves from breaches of the right to freedom 
from unwarranted search and seizure of communications. They were found guilty and dismissed 
without penalty.182 In 1997 Williams argued that protesters should be discharged without 
conviction as they were motivated by humanitarian or altruistic motives. The judge warned him 
and witnesses, including MP Rod Donald, not to stray into political territory. All but one were 
convicted and discharged.183 
It was the trial of the Domebusters that generated the greatest legal attention. The trial had been 
moved to Wellington to avoid a biased jury, partially due to the testimony of Murray Horton 
from the ABC which outlined a history of opposition in Blenheim to the ABC and anti-base 
protesters.184 All three were charged with burglary and wilful damage. The defence’s case was 
based on a ‘claim of right’ that they believed that they were protecting lives by damaging the 
base, and that this made their actions legal. The jury took two hours to return a not guilty 
verdict.185 The verdict was received with disbelief nationwide, particularly in Blenheim where 
the Marlborough Express expressed the outrage that many locals felt: ‘Anger over acquittal of 
activists’.186 
The Crown then pursued the three in a civil case, seeking $1.2 million in damages. Initially 
successful in both the High Court and the Appeal Court, the Crown eventually dropped the case 
in 2014, most likely because none of the three had sufficient assets to make the exercise 
anything more than a political action to save face.187 The legal successes of the Domebusters 
provided possibly as much attention as their original action, but were also very unpopular. 
Politics 
In the political space, the campaign can claim some successes. The role of parliament in 
oversight of the GCSB is, at least on paper, one of increased responsibility over the past thirty 
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years. The GCSB was created in 1977 under the Royal Prerogative without public or 
parliamentary knowledge.188 The frustration of some parliamentarians with early GCSB secrecy 
was expressed by Labour MP Jim Sutton to the Coordinator of Domestic and Internal Security, 
Gerald Hensley, in a 1988 Finance and Expenditure Select Committee hearing: 
Sutton: You’re not going to tell us how much you’re spending, how much you want 
us to approve; you’re not telling us what it’s spent on, you’re not telling us who’s 
spending it, but nevertheless you feel we should approve this expenditure? 
Hensley: That’s true.189 
Until 2003 the GCSB had no enabling legislation, but oversight of their activities was increased 
through creation of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, and an Inspector-
General of Intelligence and Security in 1996. Campaigners argue that neither institutions was 
fully aware of the activities of the GCSB, and functioned as a rubber stamp.190 
Nelson MP John Blincoe took particular interest in the base and transparency of its operations 
in the early 1990s. In 1994 he wrote to the Director of the GCSB seeking a briefing on the base, 
unsuccessfully.191 The 1997 protest was the first to have MPs present, with Alliance MP Rod 
Donald and Labour MP Marian Hobbs attending,192 and in following years Green MPs Keith 
Locke and Green co-leaders Jeanette Fitzsimons and Metiria Turei also attended.193 In 2003, 
for the first time, a Marlborough district councillor, John Craighead, spoke out against the base 
and attended the protest.194 
Connections with MPs did assist the campaign in practical ways. In 2007 Green Party 
parliamentary researchers engaged through Keith Locke estimated the total cost of the GCSB 
over the twenty years since Waihopai was built at $500 million.195 
Lobbying activities have included two major petitions. The first, in 1988, sought to cease 
construction of the base and cease the transfer of New Zealand-sourced intelligence to foreign 
organisations. In 1998 a 1300 signature petition was presented at the base to Green MP Rod 
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Donald, requesting that both Waihopai and Tangimoana be closed.196 Prime Minister Jenny 
Shipley rejected the petition when it was received at parliament, stating that the GCSB complied 
with the law and did not target telephone conversations between New Zealand citizens.197 The 
campaign has also engaged in letter writing campaigns, targeting both Members of Parliament, 
and newspaper editors. 
The government was forced to defend the GCSB after a January 2012 dawn raid which saw 
Kim Dotcom arrested as a result of United States indictments relating to copyright infringement 
and money-laundering. In the process of opposing his extradition, his legal team learnt that the 
GCSB had had a role in gathering evidence against him. This was illegal as New Zealand 
citizens and permanent residents were not able to be spied on, and Kim Dotcom was a resident. 
By 2013 an investigation by Cabinet Secretary Rebecca Kitteridge was leaked to Fairfax Media, 
concluding that 85 people may have been illegally spied on, and that the GCSB lacked 
oversight, quality record-keeping, and legal support.198 The incident and the fallout was a 
tremendous boost for the campaign. Horton noted that “The problem that ABC has always had, 
in making an issue of the GCSB, is that it is a faceless agency… The GCSB has been dragged, 
blinking, into the spotlight and become a household name”.199 
As a result the government amended legislation governing the GCSB – the GCSB Act and the 
Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Act 2013 – to ‘clarify’ when the 
organisation could spy upon New Zealanders. The new law would allow this to occur under a 
warrant to assist the Secret Intelligence Service or the police. Prime Minister John Key argued 
that the law change was essential to keep New Zealanders safe from terrorism: "Others may 
play politics with the security and lives of New Zealanders, but I cannot and I do not and I will 
not.''200 The law change attracted considerable protest and debate, with large rallies held 
nationwide.201 
Conclusion 
For thirty years now, with decreased intensity, a campaign has been sustained against Waihopai 
spy base. Using a diverse range of tactics, from nonviolent direct action to education, lobbying, 
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research, court processes and political action, campaigners have fought to close the base. In the 
areas of education, research and political action, the campaign has seen moderate success, with 
considerable publicity and some law changes resulting. In the other areas, the campaign has 
struggled to achieve results, and even when nonviolent action has had actual impacts on the 
base, such as the Domebusters campaign, it has not been strong enough to win any substantial 
victories. While the campaign has generated a great deal of awareness of the spy base and the 
GCSB, it has failed to engage a broad range of the New Zealand community in opposing it. In 
2010 Leonard suggested one of the main reasons for this failure: 
It short, we’ve tried about everything we can think of to expose the GCSB and its 
activities to public scrutiny. It hardly needs saying that the cult of secrecy 
(embedded in legislation) that surrounds the GCSB and its operatives is their 
greatest asset. They refuse to engage in discussion or debate, they issue annual 
reports to Parliament that are devoid of substance, the rules under which they 
operate are dictated by foreign intelligence bodies, and the five nation agreement 
among the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (so-called UKUSA 
agreement of 1948) is top secret, its content known only within the intelligence 
establishment.202 
It is this issue that makes Waihopai an interesting case study of nonviolent protest. Is the 
inability to close the base inherent to the nature of the base and its governing institutions? Is it 
possible to close a base like this through a public campaign of nonviolence? Or is the failure of 
the campaign the result of failing to follow the principles and examples of nonviolent action. 
The next chapter will return to our nonviolent checklist to analyse whether the anti-Waihopai 
campaign has followed these guidelines, and if they explain its failure.  
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Chapter Three: Waihopai as a Model 
Pragmatic Nonviolent Campaign? 
In order to assess Waihopai as a pragmatic nonviolent campaign, and to assess the theory of 
nonviolence against it, I will return to the eleven point checklist. For each I will pull together 
the material from the previous chapter, analyse it against the relevant parts of the theory, and 
come to a conclusion both as to the extent by which Waihopai fulfilled this condition, and the 
success, such as it can be assessed, of this approach. I will then consider whether there are 
additional factors which should, at least in the context of this case study, be considered.  
Nature of the Campaign 
First, for the campaign to be considered as nonviolent it must be collective in nature, active 
rather than passive, undertaken outside the formal institution of the state, avoiding the use of 
all types of violence. 
In relation to collective action, the various elements of the campaign, particularly protests at 
the base, from smaller protests which have involved small numbers, to larger protests which 
have involved up to two hundred, fulfil this condition. Not only have actions always been 
collective, but, particularly during the first decade of the campaign, action plans were decided 
collectively by protest participants. This caused issues with the direction of the campaign and 
raises questions about the strategies, particularly in the mid-1990s when the right to cross 
Defence land and conflict with police came to dominate the campaign. It did however give all 
participants the ability to have ownership of actions and to engage at levels at which they felt 
comfortable. By the mid-2000s there was a discontent with the ‘protest and persuasion’ methods 
of the campaign run by the Anti-Bases Campaign (ABC). This discontent was expressed 
publicly, and influenced the actions of the Domebusters, the smallest action over the thirty years 
(comprising three participants and their supporters). 
The campaign fulfils the condition of being active. The whole campaign has been an attempt to 
seek information, to distribute that information to the New Zealand public, to change laws and 
policies, and, most importantly, to prevent the base being built or to shut it down. With the 
secretive, often passive, nature of the government and GCSB opponent, the campaign has had 
to be active in seeking to force engagement and response. Passive protest, such as relying on 
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the information that the government put in the public arena, would not have worked. 
The campaign has mostly existed outside the formal institutions of the state. Beyond several 
individual Members of Parliament, and the Green Party, the campaign has existed entirely in 
protest organisations and individuals. When MPs have engaged with the campaign, they have 
done so by attending protest events, or responding to public pressure. The campaign has actively 
pressured MPs through lobbying, petitions, and media attention, but has not often engaged with 
the formal institutions of the state, even when seeking to influence political party policy. 
The campaign has not used any type of violence. There are no reports of any violence against 
individuals by protesters. Protesters have not actively resisted arrest, indeed often they have 
willingly been arrested. The campaign has used sabotage, which will be discussed later. 
The general nature of the campaign is therefore nonviolent in nature, engaging in collective 
action, active in nature, and existing outside the formal institutions of the state. The campaign 
fulfils this condition. 
Pragmatic 
Second, for the campaign to be pragmatic in nature it must focus on end goals, and seek to win 
against the opponent primarily through accommodation or coercion rather than persuading them 
to change their minds through conversion.  
The commonly stated aim of the campaign is to close down Waihopai spy base (and the GCSB 
that runs it). This goal has been consistent throughout the thirty year history of the campaign. 
Protesters have been flexible in their means to achieve that goal, from more respectable 
activities such as education, political lobbying, and submissions, to civil disobedience such as 
trespass, property damage, occupations and disruption of the activities of the GCSB and the spy 
base. The campaign has not hesitated to switch methods in order to try and achieve success in 
the campaign, and it has celebrated methods such as the Domebusters action, in which 
significant damage and cost was incurred, despite the campaign at that time being focused upon 
education and persuasion of the New Zealand public. In short, the end goal has justified the 
means, in an entirely pragmatic way, within the constraints of nonviolence. 
Is the campaign seeking to win through accommodation or coercion, or is it seeking to persuade 
the opponent through conversion? There is very little evidence of conversion as a method. 
Actions which interact with GCSB staff, police, and security tend to be oppositional, rather than 
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seeking to convert them to the protester’s point of view. While the campaign does have a history 
of trying to persuade politicians to their point of view, they have stated publicly that they have 
given up on the Labour and National parties that dominate New Zealand politics.203 
However, there is also little evidence of a campaign that could win by accommodation. A 
refusal to engage with political parties, no evidence of negotiation, and a stated goal which is 
absolute, without allowing for any middle ground, all point away from accommodation as a 
method of change. However this conclusion should be tempered by the recognition that the 
campaign has rarely had the strength to force negotiation, and to therefore need to consider 
what a compromise position on the base might be. Certainly, over the past two decades, if the 
campaign had been more effective, accommodation would have been the likely method of 
change. 
There is some evidence of a campaign seeking to win via coercion. Early direct actions at the 
base, both against the construction and the operating facility, did not just seek publicity via 
nonviolent direct action. They sought to put pressure on the GCSB and the government through 
occupations, stopping work, and making secret information public. Again, however, the 
inability of the campaign to do this from a stronger position limited the impact of coercion. 
Indeed, the times when the campaign was at its strongest were when outside influences - such 
as the government admission that the GCSB had spied on 85 people illegally - occurred. The 
most significant pressure put on the opponents via conversion were not at the instigation or 
control of the campaign. 
The campaign is therefore pragmatic in nature, with a focus on ends over means in seeking 
change. Although there is evidence of accommodation and coercion as methods of change, 
these are diminished by the weakness of the campaign. There is little evidence of conversion as 
a method of change. The campaign therefore fulfils this second requirement. 
Consent Theory of Power 
Third, the consent theory of power needs to be applicable. That consent will need to be 
voluntarily given, rather than structurally imposed. There must be pillars of support for the 
opponent which could be removed through the protesters’ powers of leverage.  
There are pillars of support for the Waihopai spy base and the GCSB. One is the New Zealand 
                                               




and international institutions that work in this space – the New Zealand Security Intelligence 
Service and New Zealand Police who use the services of the GCSB, and the other Five Eyes 
partner spy agencies and their governments. Both sets of institutions are pillars of support, that, 
if that support was withdrawn, the goals of the campaign would advance. If the Five Eyes 
partners were to withdraw their support, the GCSB would not have the network to feed into and 
receive information from, nor the support of the larger Five Eyes spy agencies which provide 
much of the hardware, software, and expertise. This support is given voluntarily, as the Five 
Eyes partners are fully informed about the activities of the GCSB. 
I note again here Piven and Cloward’s argument that people cannot defy institutions to which 
they have no access and to which they make no contribution.204 The social distance between 
the GCSB and the other spy agencies, and the protesters, along with the secretive and 
institutionalised nature of the GCSB and Five Eyes network mean that protesters have limited 
influence over this pillar of support.  
Easier to access is the pillar of support made up by the government and Parliament which write 
the laws that govern the GCSB, set its budget, and appoint the ministers that oversee the 
institution. If the government was to change to one which had a policy of shutting down the 
GCSB, it is possible that, regardless of domestic and international pressure, this would occur. 
The 1984 election of the Labour government under a nuclear free policy and the subsequent 
nuclear free legislation indicates this. The government’s support to the base is also given 
voluntarily. A series of governments have continued to oversee and run the GCSB in the face 
of ongoing protests and frequent speculation about their activities, 
While the New Zealand voting public could be seen as a pillar of support for the base, I would 
argue that its support is largely via the proxy of elections. The wider public does not have any 
direct control over the activities of the base, they only have control over the makeup of 
parliament and some influence over the policies that they enact. At this point I turn to Galtung’s 
argument for a “great chain of nonviolence”, which uses dependence relationships between 
intermediaries to apply leverage.205 There is value therefore in having the voting public, who 
might be otherwise inactive in the campaign, educated and concerned about the issues raised 
by the campaign, if that concern can be turned into leverage over the makeup of parliament and 
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the policies that it enacts. 
The last pillar of support for the GCSB is the staff that work there. While it would be easy to 
assume that the staff working in a spy base would be impossible to turn to work against it, the 
work of Nicky Hager and the numerous GCSB sources that he used for Secret Power indicate 
that this is not so. While this is not a support pillar that could likely be removed to bring down 
the institution, it is a pillar that has provided useful information that has advanced the campaign. 
Indeed, information from the inside of the Five Eyes network released to researchers and the 
media has probably been the most successful element of the campaign. 
The campaign has had a particular focus over the past two decades on the local Blenheim 
community, through education and an approach to protests that keeps that community onside. 
However it is not apparent that the local community is a pillar of support. The support of the 
local community was not sought before the base was built, and beyond staff living in the local 
area, there are no clear benefits to the community of the base being there. There are advantages 
from keeping the local community on side, such as providing additional protesters and a 
constant presence, but that does not make it a pillar of support for the base.  
The pillars of support of the spy base and the GCSB are therefore the Five Eyes network, the 
government, and GCSB staff. Because of limited control over the former and latter, only a 
change of government would cause the spy base to be closed. The New Zealand public is also 
significant, via their ability to influence Parliament and the government. The local Blenheim 
community is not a pillar of support for the spy base. 
Field of Contention 
The fourth question is, was the campaign conducted on a field of contention which highlighted 
the asymmetry of the violence of the opponent and the nonviolence of the resisters, where 
people power has the greatest impact? 
In a modern western democracy such as New Zealand, direct violence against protesters does 
exist, but it is not common.206 In the history of protest at Waihopai spy base there is no 
indication of protesters being treated violently. Indeed, often protesters have agreed to be 
arrested, as if that were the sole aim of protesting, and police have normally escorted them 
                                               




through that process professionally. 
But the violence that nonviolent protesters are seeking to make evident is not just the response 
of the state to its actions. The asymmetry of violence/nonviolence could also be between the 
actions of the protesters and the activities of the system that Waihopai supports. If Waihopai is, 
as protesters claim, infringing on the privacy and civil rights of indigenous movements in the 
South Pacific and oppressing individuals and groups through counter-terrorism policies and 
actions, then this is a type of violence which could be made apparent. In the most part the 
campaign has failed in bringing forth the asymmetry in this way. With the exception of the 
Domebusters, who directly linked the base to victims of the War on Terror in Iraq, the campaign 
has spoken about this link, but has not made it explicit through nonviolent action. The 
campaign’s confusing imagery which shifts from year to year, and changing focus between civil 
rights, privacy, and peace issues has prevented this. 
This inability to create a field of contention is a major failing of the campaign. The campaign 
recognised this issue before construction of the base had even begun, noting that the issues were 
more complex and technical, and that “people miss the connection between the bases and the 
insidious nuclear war-fighting strategies dominating the US global view”.207 The inability to 
create the link was no stronger post-2001 when the goal should have been to connect the base 
to the War on Terror, particularly in Iraq, which was not widely supported by New Zealanders. 
The campaign raised these issues frequently in their speeches and educational materials, but 
they were very rarely able to bring them to a field of contention. 
Methods of Nonviolence Used 
The fifth question is, which of the three methods of nonviolence (protest and persuasion, non-
cooperation, nonviolent intervention) did the campaign use? 
The campaign has used two of the methods of nonviolence. The initial stage of the campaign 
used nonviolent intervention, via occupations, sabotage, and breaking into the base. After this 
first phase, the campaign moved away from this method. The second phase produced tactics 
which were unclear in terms of this typology. Protesters sought to reclaim the right to protest at 
the security gate of the base rather than the farm gate, and numerous protesters were arrested in 
pursuit of this. Further protesters were arrested in protest at police actions. Neither action was 
in pursuit of nonviolent intervention, because if they had been successful, the end result would 
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simply have been protest and persuasion in a different place outside the base, without police 
arresting police liaisons. Yet they also are not obviously protest and persuasion, or non-
cooperation, because the target has ceased to be the base and its actions, but instead issues of 
civil rights while protesting. The best fit for this period is protest and persuasion, but about an 
issue which is only tangentially related to the goals of the campaign. 
Over the past two decades the campaign has been firmly focused on methods of protest and 
persuasion, out of concern that the methods of the first decade of the campaign were not 
working, and to seek to keep the local Blenheim community engaged with protesters and 
learning about the base. Some of the strongest elements of the campaign, such as research and 
engagement with the government over law changes, sit within the persuasion component of this 
method. The only exception to this was in 2008 when the Domebusters engaged in sabotage, a 
return to nonviolent intervention which came as a surprise to the ABC which was in sole charge 
of the campaign by then. 
There is very little evidence of the campaign using non-cooperation. There was no attempt to 
place pressure on contractors building the various components of the base from amongst the 
local community, nor on GCSB staff, either in Blenheim or Wellington. Most of these options 
in hindsight appear unlikely to have assisted the campaign, and it is logical that the campaign 
avoided them. The only non-cooperation which did occur was the release of information from 
inside the GCSB to Nicky Hager. This low level activity from within the opposition made a 
significant contribution to the campaign. 
The methods of nonviolence used by the campaign were therefore primarily nonviolent 
intervention and protest and persuasion. Non-cooperation had a very limited role. 
Methods Likely to Engage Mechanisms of Change 
The sixth question is, were the methods used likely to engage any of the four mechanisms of 
change (conversion, accommodation, coercion, disintegration)? The only conversion from the 
pillars of support to the protesters has been some limited support from staff inside the GCSB 
by the provision of information. This is valuable as part of the campaign, but that is where the 
conversion has stopped – well short of any substantial change within the organisation. There 
has been no conversion of either of the other two pillars of the international Five Eyes network 
or the government. Of all the political parties in New Zealand, only the Green Party has been a 
consistent opponent of the GCSB and Waihopai spy base. The ABC has effectively given up 
on the Labour Party, a likely target of a parliamentary conversion and has deliberately chosen 
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not to follow the model of the nuclear free campaign, which was eventually successful through 
the adoption of a nuclear free policy by Labour, and their election to government in 1984. The 
abandonment of this potential method of change is somewhat confounding. The campaign has 
not sought to infiltrate the party grassroots, many of whom would be opposed to the base and 
its activities, and to create upwards pressure for the party to adopt a policy of change. The 
current Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s partner, Clarke Gayford, met her in 2013 when he 
arranged a meeting with her to discuss the potential erosion of privacy proposed by the GCSB 
Amendment Bill.208 There are opportunities in relation to Labour led governments that the 
campaign has not exploited because they feel that Labour is not interested. Yet nonviolence 
provides a mechanism to make a political party interested, by giving power to an engaged party 
membership. The campaign’s educational approach alone is unlikely to lead to change. Shock’s 
argument that campaigns should engage in multiple channels (institutional and non-
institutional) has predicted this failure by the campaign.209 
The actions of the campaign are however likely to lead to accommodation, particularly research, 
legal campaigns and engagement with the government over law changes. Indeed the campaign 
provided several opportunities for education, and one of the successes of the campaign is that 
it has maintained public awareness of the base and pressure on the government, so that when 
issues such as illegal spying come up, the media and some of the public have a basic awareness. 
Unfortunately for the campaign many accommodations have either been of mixed value, or 
have achieved the opposite of what the campaign sought. An example is the 2013 law change 
in which the government, having said for years that New Zealanders were not able to be spied 
on, sought to ‘clarify’ the law, allowing New Zealanders to be spied on under certain conditions. 
I would argue that a refusal to engage further in a political space, with, for example, the Labour 
Party, has limited the ability of the campaign to capitalise on these opportunities. 
The third and fourth methods of change, coercion and disintegration, are both unlikely in the 
context of a modern Western democracy such as New Zealand, and unlikely to be successful 
given the methods of the campaign. There is no reasonable argument that any New Zealand 
protest movement over the past fifty years, regardless of success, has caused coercion or 
disintegration of any opponent. 
The relevant mechanisms of change are therefore conversion and accommodation. The methods 
                                               
208 "PM Jacinda Ardern Quashes Speculation She Got Engaged at the Weekend," Stuff, Dec. 4 2017. 
209 Schock, Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies, 164-70. 
46 
 
of the campaign were not likely to lead to either. An inability to operate simultaneously in both 
the protest space, along with working to capture a major political party such as the Labour 
Party, is a major failing of the campaign. It has not identified a plan which incorporates a likely 
mechanism of change. 
Response of the Opponent 
In the most part the campaign has been unable to force a response from the opponent. Over the 
first decade, the most response that protests aroused was arrests or other intervention by the 
police. Despite debates about various actions of the police which protesters sometimes felt was 
inappropriate (arresting police liaisons, one officer wearing a TASER for which police later 
apologised) at no time was there violence on the part of the police. Arrests were normally 
reasonable, and often sought by protesters as part of their campaign. 
The GCSB response to the campaign has almost entirely been absent. There have been a few 
brief appearances by GCSB staff in court, opportunities that arrested protesters have been 
unable to capitalise on. GCSB staff have had almost no interaction with the campaign, and the 
institution has remained relatively anonymous. The main exception was the GCSB 2006 media 
statement following the reporting on Lange’s top secret GCSB materials, though I also note 
former GCSB Director Sir Bruce Ferguson’s confirmation of the GCSB’s mass collection 
methods on New Zealanders in 2015.210 An inability to remove the veil of secrecy from the 
GCSB has been an ongoing issue during the campaign. 
The campaign has had greater success with getting a response from the government. At various 
times the government has responded to campaign claims about the base and its activities.211 
However this response has tended to devolve into a debate about the reality of these activities 
between the two sides which has been hampered by secrecy and obfuscation on the part of the 
government. 
The campaign has had some success when protesters have been subject to legal responses, 
particularly the Domebusters. The criminal and civil legal cases after this action generated as 
much attention as the original action, and the civil case was quietly dropped once the 
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government had ‘saved face’. This was a significant victory. 
But overall the inability of protesters to force a response from the opponent has stymied the 
campaign. Where there has been a response, it has in the most part been voluntary and 
considered by the government, rather than forced and irrational. The opponent has therefore 
retained control over how, when, and where it responds, and has in the most part chosen not to.  
The campaign has been unable to wrest control of this dynamic by forcing the opponent to 
respond. The significance of the inability to force a response has been predicted by Sharp.212 
Campaign’s Reaction to that Response 
How did the campaign react to that response? First I note that the limited response makes the 
ability to answer this question limited. I cannot speculate what the reaction would have been to 
responses that did not occur. 
In relation to engagement with the government, the campaign has invested considerable 
resources in seeking to win arguments about the activities of the base, and educating the public 
about these actions. In what Keyes213 has termed a ‘post-truth era’ however, where there are 
not just truth, and lies, but a third category of statements that are not exactly the truth, but which 
fall just short of a lie, the campaign has never quite won this battle. Indeed, often by the time 
documents have proven much of what the campaign has argued, the government argument 
changes and it ‘clarifies’ the law, and the public debate moves on. It is, however, difficult to 
imagine a strategy which could have approached this problem differently. To return to Gandhi’s 
definition of satyagraha, which is “the fight for truth and collective self-realisation through 
nonviolent resistance against falsity, violence and oppression, and a preparedness to endure the 
personal consequences of this fight and struggle”,214 it is clear that inherent to nonviolent action 
is a search for truth, and a resistance against deception, which leaves protesters on difficult 
ground if they chose not to engage in this debate. 
The campaign’s reaction to the main government response, the legal cases pursued against the 
Domebusters, has been supportive, but it has not been able to turn this into a victory for the 
campaign. The position, at the end of the legal battle, was a return to default position – the 
GCSB operating as normal and protesters avoiding considerable legal and financial 
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consequences. The campaign did not discontinue its actions, but by this stage they were so weak 
as to be ineffectual. The theory suggested that further nonviolent action would escalate the 
conflict, but there was no attempt to respond to the government’s actions by engaging in further 
nonviolent action, whether against the base, or against the government institutions involved in 
running it and pursuing the Domebusters. This was a missed opportunity. 
Despite the small response of the opponent to protesters, the campaign therefore failed to take 
opportunities to engage in ongoing actions. However this occurred, not as Sharp predicted, 
because they were afraid of repressions, but instead because the campaign was too weak and 
failed to take the opportunity to raise the stakes further when it was approaching a moment of 
heightened intensity. This is likely due to a lack of resources - a mobilisation problem.215  
Did Political Jiu Jitsu Occur? 
Did ‘political jiu jitsu’ take place where a nonviolent response to repression empowered the 
nonviolent movement? There is no evidence of political jiu jitsu occurring in this campaign. 
The author has previously noted this process occurring in protests in New Zealand,216 so it is 
not impossible in this context, but the campaign against Waihopai has failed to generate the sort 
of repression which would bring political jiu jitsu into play. There has been no violent 
repression, very little restriction on civil liberties, and legal measures have tended to be 
restrained. 
It is therefore not possible to assess this part of the nonviolent theory using this campaign, 
except in its absence. Indeed, the failure of the campaign to bring the interaction between 
protesters and the opponent to a condition where a response has been forced from the state, 
where political jiu jitsu could occur, is a likely answer to its failure. 
Would Principled Nonviolence have Led to Better Outcomes? 
Would, therefore, the campaign have been likely to be more successful if it had adopted a 
principled rather than pragmatic approach? What would a principled nonviolent campaign have 
looked like? First, there would be more of a focus on the self, particularly self-improvement. 
Some elements of this have appeared in the Waihopai campaign, particularly the women’s 
camps which had a strong focus on education and feminism. Expanding this across the whole 
campaign would have required a less transitory protester population, with greater commitment 
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to broader issues of nonviolence. 
Second, there would have been a programme of constructive nonviolence. It is difficult to 
imagine a way for the campaign to create an alternative spy base, with different policies and 
targets, both because of the technical nature of the type of spying that occurs at Waihopai, but 
also because the stated aim of the ABC has been to close the base and not engage in spying of 
this nature. This is not the universal view of everyone in the campaign,217 but it certainly is the 
dominant one. I note however the functional theories of Robert Merton, who argued that 
institutions serve a function for society, and if those institutions are removed without 
constructing an alternative that supplies those functions, society demands their return. The goal 
should therefore not be to just close down the GCSB, but replace it with something which meets 
the needs of society in a better way. Sharp argued for peace movements to draw a distinction 
between structure and function – by accepting the need for defense, without accepting the need 
for a military. This distinction opens up a space to consider alternative means of defense.218 In 
the post-911 environment, the functions that society is seeking to fulfil are security and safety, 
indeed these are the arguments that the government has turned to in order to justify the GCSB’s 
ongoing existence and legal structure. While it would not be possible for the campaign to build 
an alternative, it would be possible to describe what that constructive alternative might look 
like. The ABC has not outlined what a spy agency based on respect for international law, 
security of New Zealanders, and transparency and accountability might consist of. There is 
however considerable material on civilian-based defence and alternatives to traditional military, 
which would provide a good starting point for this debate.219 This would be a valuable exercise, 
particularly in the hope of achieving change through accommodation. 
Third, the campaign would focus increasingly on conversion, with nonviolent action, 
particularly the suffering of nonviolent actionists being a tool to achieve that change. There are 
elements of this in the principles of the 2008 ploughshares action, particularly the commitment 
to stay and face arrest and legal consequences. If this was to be more widespread throughout 
the campaign, we might see longer term commitments to protest action, possibly a blockade of 
the base which prevented staff entering for several days, and protesters placing themselves in 
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situations which forced a strong response from the police. 
Lastly, an increased focus on means might lead to the abandonment of secrecy and property 
damage in the planning and implementation of protests.  
It is difficult to assess whether these principled alternatives would have made the campaign 
more successful. Some certainly would have required a greater commitment to internal issues 
such as education and nonviolence training, while others a greater commitment to protest in 
order to engage Gandhian suffering principles. Overall it would require more people with a 
greater commitment to the campaign – elements which may also have made the pragmatic 
approach more successful. They do however highlight alternatives which can be considered. 
Effectiveness of Sabotage 
How effective was sabotage as part of the nonviolent campaign? The campaign against 
Waihopai provides an opportunity to assess sabotage as part of two different strategies. The 
first is the use of sabotage to facilitate protest. This happened in several different occasions in 
the first couple of years, including during construction. Several times protesters cut through 
(and in one instance drove through) the fence or gate to get access to the secure part of the site, 
to then occupy it. This illustrates the difficulty of gaining access to the facility once security 
fences were built. This tactic facilitated wider nonviolent protest, and had few negative 
consequences for the campaign. In relation to Sharp’s concerns about sabotage, these protests 
involved large numbers of protesters and did not move the field of contention to between human 
beings and property, the property was simply an obstacle in the way of the protest action being 
effective. 
The second is sabotage as a goal in itself. Early on protesters cut farm fencing, and dug up and 
cut service cables. These activities were done in secret, had little impact upon the base, and 
received little attention, positive or negative. In terms of keeping the local community on side, 
they certainly were ineffective, and protesters abandoned them for the rest of the campaign. 
The Domebusters action is more difficult to assess. While the action was also conducted in 
secret, the activists did not take the opportunity to flee the site after its completion, but instead 
stayed to be arrested, and face the legal consequences and public outrage. Those legal 
consequences were divisive, but provided a large victory for the campaign when they were 
found not guilty of criminal charges, and the state was subsequently unable to pursue a civil 
case. The action did put one satellite dish out of action for a time, making this the only act of 
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sabotage which had actual impacts upon the base and its activities. In relation to Sharp’s 
concerns about sabotage, the action did involve a small group of people, but was successful 
regardless. And, despite the action being taken against property, the field of contention rapidly 
focused to being between the Domebusters and the government, so property damage did not 
divert from this. 
It is therefore impossible to rule out sabotage as a nonviolent action based on this case study. 
Sabotage can be carried out collectively and with concern for the opponent, and does not 
necessarily breach Sharp’s principles of nonviolence. However it is best used in minor ways, 
to achieve larger protest goals, or, when used as a goal in itself, openly and with full intention 
to face the consequences.  
Limitations of Pragmatic Nonviolent Theory 
What are the successes and failures of the campaign that are not explained by pragmatic 
nonviolent theory? 
Many times the campaign has been strengthened when an outside event has occurred that the 
campaign has been able to take advantage of. The Kim Dotcom arrest with its illegal spying 
revelations, and the resulting law change have been some of the more significant moments for 
the campaign, when a wide spectrum of New Zealand was becoming more aware of the base 
and debating what happened there. This influence of outside events is not part of the nonviolent 
theory applied in this case study, and it would be a valuable addition. 
In April 2017 New Zealand hosted a conference in Queenstown of the agencies that make up 
the Five Eyes network.220 The meeting passed without protest, or even comment by the ABC, 
despite the heads of all five spy agencies, plus the heads of security agencies such as the FBI, 
CIA, New Zealand’s SIS and police, and various government Ministers and officials being 
present. This is a missed opportunity. No attempt was made to organise activists from across 
New Zealand, particularly those near to Queenstown, to protest this event. The ABC has no 
social media presence, a reflection both of concerns with the security of social media, and the 
age and technical competence of the members of the organising committee, so its ability to 
attract activists via passive means and coordinate them quickly from their base in Christchurch 
is limited. 
                                               




This is but one example of the campaign’s inability to maintain constant pressure upon their 
opponent. In the early years of the campaign, there were multiple events at the base, but after it 
was opened, this quickly settled down to one or two a year. The campaign became something 
that could be engaged with for a weekend, and then ignored for the rest of the year. When 
actions or external events provided opportunities, such as the Domebusters action, the campaign 
was unable to take advantage of them by further nonviolent action. Resourcing is an important 
factor in a campaign, but it is not explicitly outlined in our nonviolent theory. 
Conclusion 
Beyond these exceptions however, nonviolent theory has acted as a good predictor of the 
successes and failures of the campaign. The campaign has largely followed pragmatic 
nonviolence principles. There are identifiable pillars of support which could be engaged on a 
field of contention, but the campaign has struggled to do this. Campaign methods have focused 
on nonviolent intervention initially, and protest and persuasion throughout, but these methods 
as implemented have been unlikely to engage a mechanism of change. The biggest failing of 
the campaign has been an inability to force a response from the opponent, limiting the ability 
of the campaign to react, and preventing political jiu jitsu from occurring. Principled 
nonviolence has been considered as an alternative, but its possibilities come with increased 
resource cost and commitment, and sabotage has been effective as a protest method when used 






Writing in 2008, Jarrod Booker of the New Zealand Herald provided this assessment of the 
annual protest at the base: 
A small band of protesters know they will be ignored as they march on New 
Zealand’s top-secret Waihopai “spy base” today. 
Just like every other year, their calls for the closure of the facility that “leaves blood 
on New Zealanders’ hands” will be met with deafening silence from those behind 
the high-security perimeter fence. 
But protest organisers will not be put off. “We keep going as long as the bloody 
place is there… to at least remind people about it.221 
Booker is reporting on a campaign, which is about to get a large boost only three months later 
with the Domebusters action, but which is accepting of its failure over twenty years to achieve 
its major goals. By this stage, the campaign was limited to an annual protest in Blenheim and 
outside the gates at which it tried to educate the public and get some media attention nationwide. 
And yet two years later, a Dominion Post editorial on the Domebusters trial noted that: 
The curiosity is Father Murnane’s comment outside the court that “we have shown 
New Zealanders there is a US spybase in our midst”. It is no great secret that there 
is a base at Waihopai, and nor is there a swell of public opinion against it, though 
it is a regular target for protesters.222 
For most of the past three decades, there has been a campaign running in New Zealand to inform 
the public, particularly the local Blenheim community, about the spy base and what it does. 
This campaign goal has largely been successful, as many New Zealanders know that Waihopai 
exists, and have some understanding of the debates about what goes on there. But that is where 
the campaign stops. Education, in itself, has not brought about change to this situation, and, I 
would argue, given the perceived strategic value to the government of being part of the Five 
Eyes network and running Waihopai, nor will it ever. Meyers notes that, where it is used and 
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tolerated, the ‘ritualization of civil disobedience practices make protest safer, easier, and more 
prevalent, [yet] they also make it less effective’”.223 The anti-Waihopai campaign has fully 
entered this ritual space. 
This dissertation has been an attempt to answer why this has occurred, by comparing the 
campaign with pragmatic nonviolence theory. It has begun by outlining pragmatic nonviolence 
theory, creating a list of eleven points and questions to analyse the Waihopai campaign against. 
A pragmatic nonviolence campaign should involve collective action undertaken outside the 
formal institution of the state, avoid the use of all types of violence, be pragmatic in nature, and 
be applied to a campaign where the consent theory of power applies, with pillars of support for 
the opponent. In order to assess the campaign it was considered whether it took place on a field 
of contention which highlighted the asymmetry of the violence of the opponent and the 
nonviolence of the resisters, which of the three methods of nonviolence (protest and persuasion, 
non-cooperation, nonviolent intervention) it used, whether these methods were likely to engage 
any of the four mechanisms of change (conversion, accommodation, coercion, disintegration), 
did the nonviolent resistance force a response from the opponent, how did the resistance react 
to that response, and did ‘political jiu jitsu’ take place where a nonviolent response to repression 
empowered the nonviolent movement. And then finishing with two questions: would adopting 
a principled approach have led to better outcomes, and was sabotage effective as part of a 
nonviolent campaign? 
In outlining the case study of thirty years of protest at Waihopai spy base, I have begun with 
some information on the base and the debates about its activities. I have outlined the context in 
which the campaign started, both in terms of the wider peace movement in New Zealand up 
until 1987, but also specifically the history of the anti-bases campaign up to that point. Then 
the campaign against the base was outlined, starting with protests at the site, which can be 
summarised in three linear phases. The first, during construction and the first year of the base 
was a period of more intense protest, including site occupations and a four month long women’s 
camp. The second, which ran for most of the 1990s, saw ongoing protest, often focused on the 
right to protest at the front gate of the base and police responses to protesters. The third phase, 
which has run for the past two decades, has seen a focus on education, peaceful protest and 
keeping the local community onside. This third phase was however broken by a ploughshares 
action in 2008 which damaged the base. Then the broader campaign was explored, including 
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education, international links, research, legal processes, and traditional political action. These 
broader actions provided a significant amount of media attention and public awareness, but 
were unable to advance the campaign beyond that to achieve its goals. 
Chapter three brought the earlier two chapters together, analysing the Waihopai campaign case 
study against the pragmatic nonviolence checklist. The campaign involved collective action, 
outside the formal institutions of the state, and did not use violence. The campaign is pragmatic 
in nature, with a focus on ends over means. It operates in a context where consent theory of 
power is applicable. Pillars of support are the New Zealand and international spy agencies, the 
New Zealand Parliament and government, and GCSB staff. The New Zealand voting public is 
an influence, but only in terms of their ability to influence the makeup of parliament and the 
policies that are instituted. The local Blenheim community is not a pillar of support. The 
campaign has struggled to identify and operate on a field of contention, particularly with its 
inability to link via nonviolent protest the base and New Zealander’s concerns with the War on 
Terror. 
The campaign chose to use nonviolent intervention and protest and persuasion as methods, 
rather than non-cooperation. The relevant mechanisms of change for the campaign were 
conversion and accommodation, however the methods of protest were unlikely to achieve 
either, due to a limited engagement with political parties that could enact change. The campaign 
has struggled to force a response from opponents in relation to its actions, and where the 
opponent has responded, it has been able to do so at times of its choosing. The campaign has 
struggled to react to the limited responses it has received, and was unable to engage in further 
direct action at the base after the Domebusters attack, which may have escalated the conflict 
and forced further responses. Political ‘jiu jitsu’ therefore did not occur. 
Any assessment of the alternative principled nonviolence approach is speculative. There are 
possible advantages from an increased internal focus on the campaign, a more constructive 
approach to outlining alternatives to the base, and a greater focus on persuasion. However the 
greater resource commitment that this would require may provide a counterbalance to these 
advantages. Last, the Domebusters action provides an opportunity to assess sabotage, which 
Sharp rejected, as part of a nonviolent campaign. Sabotage can be effective when used in ways 
which continue to fulfil many of the nonviolent principles that Sharp outlined, and so it should 
remain part of the nonviolent toolbox. 
The campaign against Waihopai has been most successful when it has been one of conflict, 
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conflict that forces a response. Nepstad idealises nonviolent campaigning thus: 
 …every move in a nonviolent conflict evokes a response from the other side. The 
struggle is a highly iterative process of offensive campaigns by civil resisters and 
defensive responses from their opponents, which in turn lead to further actions by 
nonviolent activists.224 
The campaign against Waihopai never fulfilled this condition. 
But Shock notes that the success of campaigns can be considered both in terms of their direct 
goals – in this instance, the closing down of the Waihopai spy base and the dismantlement of 
the GCSB. But alternatively they can be conceived in terms of their impact upon culture and 
individuals.225 The success of the anti-Waihopai campaign over the last thirty years in this area 
should not be underestimated. The campaign has kept the public aware of the base, its activities, 
issues of privacy, spying, and involvement with international powers and their military actions. 
When the base comes to the forefront of the public’s mind, the debate that follows is built upon 
this foundation. The campaign has not been without value. 
When compared with pragmatic nonviolence theory, an analysis of the campaign highlights that 
the theory predicts the failures of the campaign. An inability to link methods of nonviolent 
action to mechanisms of change and to draw a response from its opponent, is key. This does 
not mean that if the campaign had followed the theory outlined, that their campaign would have 
been successful. Not all campaigns will be, and to campaign against a strategically important 
and secretive spying base is a significant challenge, due to the lack of transparency about what 
it actually does, and because successive governments, rightly or wrongly, have been committed 
to the base and its activities. However it is clear that the campaign would have been stronger if 
it had taken pragmatic nonviolent theory to heart, and modified its plans to fit it more closely. 
Nepstad asks whether we can assume the factors shaping nonviolent revolutions against 
political rulers are the same as the ones that shape nonviolent struggles against other 
organisations and systems.226 To conclusively answer that question would be to make a claim 
based entirely on speculation. However I can conclude that it appears likely that the theory is 
flexible enough to be adapted towards different contexts such as New Zealand, and specifically 
against a Five Eyes spy base, and within that context activists have to apply it with creativity 
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and flexibility to get around specific barriers and complications. There are no indications that a 
well-applied pragmatic nonviolent strategy would not work in this context. 
I have considered whether there were significant factors in the campaign that were not predicted 
by the nonviolent theory. The theory does not account for external events, outside of campaign 
actions, that had a significant impact upon the environment that protesters and the opponent 
were operating in. The arrest of Kim Dotcom and the subsequent revelation that 85 New 
Zealanders may have been illegally spied on were significant influences upon the campaign and 
government actions in changing the law. The ability of campaigns to be prepared for and take 
advantage of these sorts of opportunities is key. The Waihopai campaign was unable to do this 
when the principal actors in the Five Eyes network were attending a conference in New Zealand 
in 2017 and no protest activity occurred. Campaigns need to engage full modern communication 
methods and structures, such as social media, and have adequate resourcing to take advantage 
of these sorts of opportunities. 
The only place where the theory did not predict the nature of the campaign, was the inability of 
the campaign to react to the opposition’s response. The theory predicted that the campaign 
might back down under repression. In this case study repression was limited. The inability of 
the campaign to react and escalate the conflict was due instead to a lack of resources and an 
unwillingness to take up these opportunities. 
But other than these two notes, the pragmatic nonviolence theory outlined in chapter one is 
strong when compared with the Waihopai campaign. It has predicted many of the crucial 
elements of nonviolence, strategic planning, and implementation that reflect the strengths and 
weaknesses of the campaign. While only a case study, this research strongly suggests that the 
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